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Abstract

This research develops a new framework for evaluating the occupational
risks of exposure to hazardous substances in any setting where As Low As Reasonably
Achievable (ALARA) practices are mandated or used. The evaluation is performed by
developing a hypothesis-test-based procedure for evaluating the homogeneity of various
epidemiological cohorts, and thus the appropriateness of the application of aggregate
data-pooling techniques to those cohorts. A statistical methodology is then developed as
an alternative to aggregate pooling for situations in which individual cohorts show
heterogeneity between them and are thus unsuitable for pooled analysis.
These methods are then applied to estimate the all-cancer mortality risks incurred
by workers at four Department-of-Energy nuclear weapons laboratories. Both linear, nothreshold and dose-bin averaged risks are calculated and it is further shown that
aggregate analysis tends to overestimate the risks with respect to those calculated by the
methods developed in this work.
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The risk estimates developed in Chapter 2 are, in Chapter 3, applied to assess the
risks to workers engaged in americium recovery operations at Los Alamos National
Laboratory. The work described in Chapter 3 develops a full radiological protection
assessment for the new americium recovery project, including development of exposure
cases, creation and modification of MCNP5 models, development of a time-and-motion
study, and the final synthesis of all data. This work also develops a new risk-based
method of determining whether administrative controls, such as staffing increases, are
ALARA-optimized. The EPA’s estimate of the value of statistical life is applied to these
risk estimates to determine a monetary value for risk. The rate of change of this “risk
value” (marginal risk) is then compared with the rate of change of workers’
compensations as additional workers are added to the project to reduce the dose (and
therefore, presumably, risk) to each individual.
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Chapter 1. Historical Analysis
1.1 Introduction
This research develops a new framework for evaluating the occupational risks of
exposure to hazardous substances in any setting where As Low As Reasonably
Achievable (ALARA) practices are mandated or used. The evaluation is performed by
developing a hypothesis-test-based procedure for evaluating the homogeneity of various
epidemiological cohorts, and thus the appropriateness of the application of data-pooling
techniques to those cohorts. A statistical methodology is then developed as an alternative
to pooling for situations in which individual cohorts show heterogeneity between them
and are thus unsuitable for pooled analysis.
These methods are then applied to estimate the all-cancer mortality risks incurred
by workers at four Department-of-Energy nuclear weapons laboratories: Los Alamos
National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Rocky Flats Plant, and the
Hanford Site. Both linear, no-threshold and dose-bin averaged risks are calculated and it
is further shown that pooled analysis tends to overestimate the risks with respect to those
calculated by the methods developed in this work.
The risk estimates developed in Chapter 2 are, in Chapter 3, applied to assess the
risks to workers engaged in americium recovery operations at Los Alamos National
Laboratory. The work described in Chapter 3 develops a full radiological protection
assessment for the new americium recovery project, including development of exposure
cases, creation and modification of MCNP5 models, development of a time-and-motion
study, and the final synthesis of all data. This work also develops a new method of
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determining whether administrative controls, such as staffing increases, are ALARAoptimized. The EPA’s estimate of the value of statistical life is applied to these risk
estimates to determine a monetary value for risk. The rate of change of this “risk value”
(marginal risk) is then compared with the rate of change of workers’ compensations as
additional workers are added to the project to reduce the dose (and therefore, presumably,
risk) to each individual.
This work develops, from basic epidemiological data, a framework for assessing
ALARA practices at specific institutions. By developing institutionally-specific risks in
the manner performed in this work (accounting for heterogeneity between cohorts and
using the new methodology developed herein) and applying them to a risk-benefit
analysis, it is possible to quantitatively determine whether the dose from a given practice
is, truly, ALARA. Further, the risk-benefit analysis methodology provides a rational basis
for estimates of ALARA-reasonable values.

1.2 Background
1.2.1 Quantities
Historical Dose Limits
The motivation for this project is almost as old as radiation protection itself. The
interplay between the level of operational radiation protection and the cost of
administering this protection has been contentious since the discovery of the biological
effects of radiation in the late 19th century. Thus, a brief history (by way of literature
review) of the development of the major organizations driving national dose limit policies
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and the development of the policies themselves is necessary to place this work into
context.
Even the most encyclopedic histories of radiation protection claim to be anything
but complete, and this section is no different. The goal here is to present the development
of the ideas that have influenced dose-management policies both in general and with a
focus at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL, Los Alamos, the Laboratory). Before
discussing the history of dose limits, a brief summary of the quantities and units typically
used in radiation protection is provided. These definitions are based on the 2007
recommendations of the International Commission on Radiation Protection, ICRP
(Report 103 [1]).
Absorbed Dose
The absorbed dose is a measure of the amount of energy deposited by radiation in
a mass of matter; in a biological context, this matter refers to tissue. The current Système
International (SI) unit of absorbed dose is the gray (Gy) defined as 1 joule deposited per
kilogram of tissue. An older unit of absorbed dose is the radiation absorbed dose (rad)
formally defined in 1953 in centimeter-gram-seconds (cgs) units as 100 ergs of energy
absorbed in 1 gram of matter and in SI units in 1970 as 0.01 joule per kilogram of matter.
In the United States, the standard unit is the rad; in the rest of world it is the Gy.
Equivalent Dose
Some types of radiation are more likely to interact with matter than others. For
instance, an alpha particle is more likely to interact with matter than a photon. 1 The rate
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An alpha particle (a helium-4 nucleus) has 2 protons and 2 neutrons thus giving it a +2 charge and a mass
of approximately 4 atomic mass units (amu). A gamma or x-ray (photon) has no mass and is electrically
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per unit distance along a particle track at which energy is transferred from the particle to
the medium in which it travels is called the Linear Energy Transfer (LET). Radiation
types such as photons and electrons are considered low-LET radiation because they
transfer relatively little energy per mean free path (mfp). 2 To take account for the
different behaviors of different radiation types in matter, the absorbed dose can be
weighted by a radiation weighting factor to determine the “equivalent dose.” Photons and
electrons have weighting factors of 1, neutron weighting factors vary with energy, and
alpha particles have a weighting factor of 20.
The SI unit of equivalent dose is the sievert (Sv). An earlier unit, still in use in the
United States, is the roentgen equivalent man (rem). One sievert is equivalent to 100 rem.
Effective Dose
All organs in the human body do not have the same sensitivity to radiation. To
account for these differences, the equivalent dose is weighted by tissue weighting factors
accounting for the radio-sensitivity of various organs. The effective dose is then given by:
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐷𝑜𝑠𝑒 = � � 𝐷𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑏𝑒𝑑 × 𝑤𝑅 × 𝑤𝑇
𝑅

𝑇

where DAbsorbed is the absorbed dose to the whole body, 3 wR is a weighting factor where
the subscript R refers to radiation type, and wT is the tissue weighting factor. The units of

neutral. Therefore, owing to the relatively large-distance interactions related to coulombic forces, an alpha
particle is far more likely to interact with matter than a photon.
2
A mean free path is the average length a particle travels through a material before experiencing an
interaction such as scattering or absorption.
3
The term “whole body” applies when the entire body is in an approximately uniform radiation field. There
are separate limits for specific organs such as the lens of the eye and the extremities when the radiation
field is not uniform.

4

effective dose are, similar to equivalent dose, the rem and the sievert. Unless otherwise
specified, in this work the term “dose” refers to effective dose.
Committed Effective Dose
When radionuclides are ingested, inhaled, or otherwise transported into the body,
the source of ionizing radiation is no longer external and a remnant will remain in the
body continually producing ionizing radiation, i.e., the body is henceforth committed to
receiving ionizing radiation at some level. The committed effective dose is defined by the
ICRP as “the sum of the products of the committed organ or tissue equivalent doses and
the appropriate tissue weighting factors… The commitment period is taken to be 50 years
for adults and to age 70 for children” [1]. This is to say that, given biological elimination,
the committed effective dose is the effective dose to an individual over a 50-year period
(for adults) due to radiation resulting from the decay of radionuclides in the body.
Total Effective Dose
Total effective dose (TED) refers to the sum of effective dose from external
sources and committed effective dose. In many occupational situations, such as
plutonium workers at Los Alamos, committed effective dose is not considered when
setting administrative limits on dose because all internal dose is purely accidental;
ingestion or inhalation of radionuclides is never planned for in a laboratory setting
(absent radiation treatments or other controlled dosages). Limits on committed effective
dose become much more important for organizations employing workers in situations
with a high likelihood of significant internal exposure (such as uranium mining).
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The quantities of radiation protection are relatively new and improvements in the
understanding of the biological effects of ionizing radiation have led to frequent changes
in the paradigm of dose units. Below is a brief history of these developments.
1.2.2 History of Radiation Regulations
The Beginning
The age of radiation protection began with a group of factory women. In the
1920s, the biological effects of the internal deposition of radionuclides were still largely
unknown. Russ [2] had defined a unit of absorbed radiation dose, the rad, as “the quantity
of X-rays which, when absorbed, will cause the destruction of [a] malignant mammalian
cell… .” Because polonium, radium, and the radioactive properties of uranium were all
discovered between 1896 and 1898, industrial and medical uses of radionuclides were
still new enough that large-scale public-health effects were not well known. One of the
earliest industrial applications of radium was glow-in-the-dark paint. Alpha-particle
emitters such as radium-226 can be combined with a luminescent powder such as zinc
sulfide to make glow-in-the-dark paint well suited for watch and instrument dials. At the
turn of the century, watch and instrument dials were painted by hand. A common practice
among dial painters was to lick the tip of their paintbrush to make a sharp point for
precise brushwork. However, in a facility using glow-in-the-dark paint, this practice
resulted in the ingestion of large amounts of radium. The first recorded example of health
detriment among the radium-dial painters was in a paper given by New York dentist
Theodore Blum on a condition he called “radium jaw” [3]. In this paper he detailed the
unusual and intractable nature of a case of osteomyelitis (bone infection) in the jaw of a
young radium-dial painter. Other dentists in the area had noticed jaw necrosis in other
radium-dial painters [4].
6

Because of the growing evidence of sickness among the painters, the New Jersey
Consumers’ League called an expert, F. L. Hoffman, to the plant. He found striking
similarities among the death certificates of deceased former employees and inferred that
this was due to a new type of industrial poisoning [5]. Simultaneously, researchers were
observing “professional anemias” in radiologists and others involved in the medical
application of radio-isotopes [6].
By 1925, it was clear that anemia and bone necrosis, including severe infection
and leucopenia (a decrease in white blood cells), were common hazards of occupations
with significant radionuclide-ingestion risks. This was so widely known by World War II
(WWII) that when the US military began ordering watches and instruments with
luminescent faces, they assured that standards would be in place to protect the dial
painters. Robley Evans, a pioneer in early radionuclide toxicology, claimed that Navy
Captain C. Stephenson was so insistent on prompt radium standards that he threatened to
induct Evans into the Navy and assign him to the production of standards if they were not
delivered in a timely fashion [4]. The result was perhaps the first example of a
government-mandated occupational radiation-protection standard.
Standards for the protection against external sources of radiation, on the other
hand, were born from the threshold dose-response concept. The first dose limits were
based on the threshold beyond which medical radiologists observed erythema. 4 This dose
limit was called the threshold erythema dose (TED- not to be confused with Total
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Erythema, or a reddening of the skin, was the first observable effect of exposure to ionizing radiation;
sunburn is the most common example of radiation erythema.
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Effective Dose); the dose acquired due to an exposure of about 300 to 600 roentgen(R). 5
Mutscheller and Sievert independently recommended a tolerance dose (TD) of around
0.01 TED per month or roughly 0.1 to 0.2 R per day. This translates to approximately
100-200 mrem/day from photons.
Early Plutonium Standards
By the end of WWII, plutonium was being produced in kilogram quantities in the
United States to support the development and production of nuclear weapons. Given the
lessons learned over the years since the radium watch-dial painters, the US government
was interested in determining the total amount of plutonium (a known α-particle emitter)
that can be present in the body over a lifetime without causing ill effects (called the
permissible body burden). In fact, the experience with radium provided a quantitative
basis for the first plutonium standard. Robert Stone, the head of the Plutonium Project
Health Division at the Metallurgical Laboratory (MetLab) in Chicago, made the earliest
estimate of a permissible plutonium body burden, by scaling the radium standard on the
basis of the radiological differences between radium and plutonium. This included
differences in their radioactivities and those of their daughter nuclei as well as the
difference in the average energy of their α-particles [7]. These results suggested that, on a
per-mass basis, plutonium was less toxic than radium by a factor of 50 and that the
permissible body burden was therefore set to 5 µg (0.3 µCi 6) [7].

5

The roentgen is a unit of exposure defined as the amount of radiation required to liberate positive and
negative charges equal to one electrostatic unit (esu) in one cubic centimeter of dry air at standard
temperature and pressure. Where “dose” is a measure of the amount of energy absorbed in a mass of tissue
and its effects,” exposure” is a measure of the magnitude of a radiation field.
6
The curie (Ci) is a unit of radioactivity equal to 3.7 x 1010 decays per second, which is the radioactivity of
1 gram of radium-226.
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No sooner had these recommendations been made than the results of several
toxicological experiments at the Metallurgical Laboratory (Met Lab) 7 proved them
inadequate [8]. These results suggested that ingested plutonium was distributed in bones
differently, and more dangerously than radium. When Los Alamos learned of these
results, Hymer Friedell, Louis Hempelmann, J.W. Kennedy, and Wright Langham,
among others, met to discuss their impact on the 5 µg permissible body burden for
plutonium. These meetings resulted in a reduction in the standard by a factor of 5 to 1 µg
(0.06 µCi). Further discussions later at the Chalk River Conferences in Ontario led to
further reduction in the permissible body burden for plutonium 0.65 µg (0.04 µCi).
This standard remained in place until 1977 when a fundamental change in the
concept of radiation protection was brought about by the International Commission on
Radiation Protection discussed in the following sections.
The Advising Organizations
In 1925, several countries joined together to organize an International Congress
on Radiation Protection [9]. The International Congress soon realized that as the science
and practice of radiology grew, so would the need for providing guidance on radiation
protection. At the second meeting of the International Congress in 1928, the first meeting
of the International Committee on X-ray and Radium Protection was held (ICXRP).
Except for the period between 1938 and 1949, the ICXRP issued recommendations
(primarily concerning external radiation sources) roughly every three years. After World
War II ended, the ICXRP was replaced by the International Commission on Radiological
Protection (ICRP).
7

MetLab was the name given to a Manhattan-Project-era facility directed by Arthur H. Compton at the
University of Chicago charged with consolidating early nuclear weapons research.
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Meanwhile in the US, the American Medical Association along with several
radiological societies and X-ray equipment manufacturers agreed in 1928 to establish a
radiation-protection committee. The purpose of this was to present a united front when
interfacing as US ambassadors with international organizations. This organization was
called the U.S. Advisory Committee on X-ray and Radium Protection (USAXRP) and
Lauriston Taylor was elected chairman. Taylor worked for the National Bureau of
Standards (NBS) and arranged for the Bureau to commit some resources to its
management. The USAXRP remained under the NBS for roughly twenty years and
issued most of its early reports as NBS handbooks.
When the USAXRP met in 1946 to revise the X-Ray Protection Handbook (NBS
Handbook 20), they decided to reorganize to reflect the diversity of radiation protection
topics. All U.S. organizations interested in radiation protection were to be included and
the name was changed to the National Committee on Radiation Protection (NCRP).
Another part of the restructuring was the development of subcommittees dealing with the
various aspects of radiation protection, including a subcommittee on permissible internal
dose, though neither the Committee nor the NBS had any statutory responsibility for
radiation protection.
Formal Recommendations and Limits of the ICRP and NCRP
In the mid-1940s, the NCRP proposed an alternative to Tolerance Dose based on
the Roentgen Equivalent Man (rem) called the maximum permissible dose (MPD). NCRP
defined the MPD to be 0.3 rem per week or 15.6 rem/year under stipulated conditions of
exposure; long-term exposures were subject to tighter limits. Permissible dose, in this
context, was defined as “… the dose of ionizing radiation that, in the light of present

10

knowledge, is not expected to cause appreciable body injury to a person at any time
during his lifetime.” [10] This definition still suggests an underlying dependence on the
threshold concept.
Consideration of genetic effects and the growing fraction of the population that
was susceptible to exposure led the NCRP to revise its recommendations in 1958. These
new recommendations along with companion recommendations from the ICRP formed
the basis of the US Atomic Energy Commission (and later the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission) regulations that were in effect until the 1990s. They were similar to the
regulatory limits of today with the exception that they were dependent on the age at
which one received the dose. For example, for external exposure to whole body, head,
trunk, active blood-forming organs, and gonads, the cumulative MPD was limited to 5 ×
(N – 18) rem, where N is age at time of exposure. The NCRP maintained these
recommendations until 1971, at which time the biological and epidemiological data had
matured enough to support a more generalized system of radiation protection standards.
In the meantime, the ICRP had further specified the definition of permissible dose,
marking a shift from the threshold concept to the current linear-no threshold (LNT)
scheme [11].
According to the ICRP report’s definition, the permissible dose for an individual
is that dose, accumulated over a long period of time or resulting from a single exposure,
which, in the light of the present knowledge, carries a negligible probability of severe
somatic or genetic injuries. A negligible probability is still a probability, however
philosophical, and demonstrates a fundamental paradigm shift in the concept of radiation
protection.
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The 1971 NCRP report modified the concept of acceptable risk to imply that a
risk is only acceptable when it is offset by some benefit; it restricted the term MPD to
occupational exposures while the term “dose limit” referred to a limit for the general
population. The implications of this are two-fold; workers derive some benefit
(monetary) from occupational exposure that the general population does not and that their
work provides a societal benefit that offsets cancer risk to a small population. The
argument can be made that the looser regulation on radiation workers is based upon their
willingness to work jobs where radiation exposure is a concern [12]; the worker can quit
at any time whereas the general population does not have that freedom. Thus, the general
population’s unwitting exposures should be limited.
Early Risk Quantification
The rise of quantitative risk assessment in the nuclear industry instigated a
transition from traditional standards to those based on quantitative risk. ICRP used the
risk concept to explicitly state the linear, no-threshold dose-response relationship for
carcinogenic and genetic effects; specifically, a 10-4 probability per rem whole body dose
equivalent for malignant illness or a 4 × 10-5 probability per rem for hereditary illness
within the first two generations of descendants [13]. For other radiation effects, however,
absolute thresholds were assumed.
The current federal occupational limit of 0.05 Sv/year (5 rem/year) is based on the
ICRP’s definition of “occupations with a high standard of safety” as being an occupation
with an average annual death rate due to occupational hazards less than 100 per million
workers. An acceptable risk was taken as 50 deaths per million workers per year, or a 40year occupational lifetime risk of two fatalities per 1,000 workers (0.002
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fatalities/worker). The ICRP assumed that the average radiological worker receives 1/10th
the dose of the maximally exposed individuals with the doses highly skewed to the lower
end of the spectrum. Thus, to ensure an average risk of 0.002, 8 an upper limit of 10 times
this value was placed on the lifetime risk for any one individual. The annual whole-body
dose-equivalent limit for stochastic (effects which occur probabilistically such as cancer
or hereditary effects) was thus taken as:
10 × 40    
year occupational lifetime risk
10 ⋅ 0.002
= = 5 rem / year
prob
40     .(
years ⋅
whole body dose eq cancer ) 40 ⋅ 0.0001
rem

(1.1)

For members of the public, ICRP assumed that everyday unavoidable risks result
in a death rate of five deaths per year per million people, or a 70-year lifetime risk of
about 4 per 10,000 people (a probability of individual death of 0.0004). It was observed
that some individuals accept risks (car crashes, smoking) in everyday life an order of
magnitude greater. Based on this probability, the whole-body dose-equivalent limit for
stochastic risks to individual members of the public is:
10 × 70    
10 × 0.0004
y lifetime risk
=
≈ 0.5 rem / year
prob
70
0.0001
×
70     
y×
whole body dose eq.(cancer )
rem

(1.2)

In their 1991 report, however, the ICRP revised this justification after determining that
that it was not a satisfactory basis for the determination of dose limits. In that report they
compared several “test values” of annual effective dose and evaluated the risk associated

8

Because the majority of workers were assumed to receive, on average, 10% of the dose to maximally
exposed employees, if the limit were based on the average worker, the workforce-averaged risk would be
far below the acceptable level. To take credit for this, the risk is multiplied by the factor of 10 and thus the
risk averaged across the workforce was presumably maintained at the acceptable level.
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with each value. The test values and the values for their associated “attributes of
detriment” are reproduced Table 1.
Table 1. Attributes of detriment due to exposure of the working population. Figures were
reported to 2 significant digits.
Annual Effective dose (mSv)
10 20 30 50 50 (1977 data)
Approximate lifetime dose (Sv)
0.5 1.0 1.4 2.4 2.4
Probability of attributable death (%)
1.8 3.6 5.3 8.6 2.9
Weighted contribution from non-fatal cancer
0.4 0.7 1.1 1.7
Weighted contribution from hereditary effects
0.4 0.7 1.1 1.7 1.2
(%)
Aggregated detriment (%)
2.5 5.0 7.5 12
Time lost due to an attributable death given that it 13 13 13 13 10-15
occurs (y)
Mean loss of life expectancy at age 18 years (y)
0.2 0.5 0.7 1.1 0.3-0.5
To assess which of these test values was optimal, the Commission defined three
“words” 9 to indicate the degree of tolerability of an exposure or risk. These words were
“unacceptable,” “tolerable,” and “acceptable.” Unacceptable indicates that the exposure
would, in the Commission’s view, not be acceptable on any “reasonable” basis in the
normal operation of any practice in which its use was a matter of choice. Such exposures
might have to be accepted in abnormal situations, such as those during accidents.
Exposures not deemed “unacceptable” are subdivided into “tolerable” and “acceptable.”
As their names would suggest, tolerable indicates that the exposures are “undesirable but
can be tolerated” and acceptable indicates that “the system of radiological protection has
been optimized.” [14]
Based on these definitions and the data in Table 1, the Commission concluded
that the results indicate that their previous recommendation (as well as the current federal
limit), a regular annual dose of 50 mSv (5 rem), is “probably too high and would be
9

The term “words” is used here as a direct quotation from the ICRP report.
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regarded by many as being clearly so” [14] based on the expected loss of life expectancy
at this level (1.1 years) and that the probability of attributable death exceeds 8%.
Ultimately, the commission decided the following:
On the basis of the data presented above, the Commission
has reached the judgment that its dose limit should be set in
such a way and at such a level that the total effective dose
received in a full working life would be prevented from
exceeding about 1 Sv received moderately uniformly year
by year and that the application of its system of radiological
protection should be such that this figure would only rarely
be approached. The final choice of limits and the way in
which they should be expressed are influenced by the way
in which the limits will be applied in practice. The need to
ensure that the limits provide protection against
deterministic effects has also to be taken into account. [14]
The 1 Sv (100 rem) lifetime dose goal corresponds in Table 1 to the 20 mSv per
year (2 rem per year) annual limit. Though the values for the attributes of detriment
decreased in the most recent ICRP report, the Commission feels that these differences are
of no practical significance and that the previous limits provide adequate protection [1].
In terms of setting a defined limit on lifetime effective dose, the commission sees
difficulties in the practical applications of these types of limits. At the levels of dose
incurred in normal situations, excluding doses to patients in radiotherapy, the control of
stochastic effects could be based on the dose accumulated over periods of many years.
However, such long control periods can be misused by allowing a rapid accumulation of
doses and intakes near the start of a control period in the expectation, not always realized,
of smaller doses later in the period. Flexibility of this kind also weakens the emphasis on
achieving the control of exposures by design, transferring the emphasis to operational
controls. [14] Thus, the ICRP does not recommend a limit on lifetime effective dose.
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The 1977 ICRP report introduced limits based on committed dose equivalent and
on tissue weighting factors capturing the various sensitivities of organs to radiation [13].
This report was a fundamental shift in the concept of internal radiation protection. Until
1977, standards had been based on the mass (or activity) of deposited material. The
concept of tissue weighting factors was further refined in 1990 when the distinction was
drawn between dose equivalent (HT) and effective dose (HE) [14]. Dose equivalent, as it
was defined by the ICRP in 1977, is given by:

H T = ∑wT DT QT ,

(1.3)

T

which sums the product of the tissue weighting factor wT, the tissue averaged absorbed
dose DT, and the radiation quality factor QT. The 1990 recommendation suggested the use
of effective dose which accounts for both tissue target and radiation type:

=
HE

wH
∑=
∑w ∑w D
T

T

T

T

T

R

T ,R

(1.4)

R

Here, wR is the tissue-independent radiation weighting factor and wT is the radiationindependent tissue weighting factor.
From Recommendation to Regulation
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 gave exclusive authority to a newly created
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to regulate the use, transportation, and disposal of
radioactive materials used in or produced by the nuclear fission process [15]. In 1955, the
AEC published the first radiation protection regulations; Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations Part 20 (10 CFR 20) which became effective in 1957.

16

In 1974, the regulatory functions of the AEC were transferred to a new agency,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The radiation-protection regulations
administered by the NRC in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s were based largely on the 1959
recommendations of the NCRP and the ICRP [16]. In 1994, revised regulations based on
the methodology of ICRP 60 and adopting the limits expressed in NCRP 91 [17] were
enacted by 10 CFR Part 50 and remain in place. The Department of Energy followed suit
instituting identical limits in 10 CFR Part 835.
ALARA
The Linear No-Threshold risk model is the mathematical extension of the concept
that there is no generally acceptable level of radiation exposure. However, radiological
work is necessary if a society desires the benefit of nuclear medicine, nuclear-generated
electricity, the security of a nuclear arsenal, or any of the enhancements made possible by
nuclear science and engineering. Therefore, it is necessary to agree upon an “acceptable”
level of risk.
Dose limits are regulatory definitions of what the regulating organization finds
acceptable. In an attempt to reflect the advising bodies’ adoption of the LNT concept
while still maintaining workable dose limits, both the NCRP [10] and the ICRP [18]
strongly recommend that exposures are kept as low as practicable (ALAP), or in more
common parlance, as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). Current federal limits
(both from the NRC and the DOE) mandate that their defined limits are to be
implemented along with ALARA practices described briefly in the following paragraph.
ALARA, as it is defined by the ICRP, is based on three principals: keeping doses
below regulatory limits, justifying dose-limitation practices by demonstrating a net
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benefit and optimizing the radiation protection schemes by adjusting the worker’s
exposure time, their physical distance from the source, and the thickness and composition
of the shielding. To examine the validity of an ALARA practice, both the cost of health
detriment and the costs of radiation protection must be quantified and compared.
The ALARA concept is intentionally vague. Given the varied missions and
budgets of organizations engaged in radiological work, it is impossible to make
recommendations regarding what is and is not “reasonable” as far as radiation protection
is concerned. At Los Alamos, “reasonable” is formally defined in the radiological
procedure P121 [19] as $2,000 per person-rem avoided and up to $10,000 per person-rem
avoided for individuals approaching their 2 rem/year Los Alamos administrative limit.
The definition of “reasonable” at LANL has not changed in many years. While no
justification is provided for the figures quoted in P121, a literature search shows several
attempts to quantify an estimate of the reasonable costs per person rem avoided. Because
the justification of the reasonable amounts is not provided by the radiation protection
organization, this work attempts to evaluate the definition using methods from the
literature.
A 200 $/person-rem value was derived by J. E. Cohen in the early 1970s. [20] The
values in the literature typically range from 10 $/person-rem to 1,000 $/person-rem, [21]
though these numbers are not adjusted for inflation. 10 The primary assumption of
Cohen’s analysis is based on a 1972 report of the BEIR committee, which calculates that
exposing the entire US population to 5 rem per generation (defined as 30 years) or 170

10

The ICRP uses values in the range of $10,000 to $20,000 per person sievert ($100 to $200 per person
rem) in the numerical results developed in their report.
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mrem/year would eventually lead to an increase of 5% in the ill-health of the population
[22]. Assuming annual US national healthcare expenditures (as of 2012) of $2.8 trillion
[23] leading to a cost of detriment of $5 trillion based on Cohen’s assumption that
detriment is roughly twice the value of the total expenditures, increase in costs from
radiation-induced ill-health become:
$5.6 × 1012 × 5% = $2.8 × 1011 .

(1.5)

Also, assuming a US population of 311 million, a 30-year generation time and an
exposure of 5 rem/generation, the value is calculated, based on Cohen’s methodology, as:
$2.8 ×1011 / year ⋅ 30 years / gen
≈ 5, 402 $/person-rem
5 rem / gen ⋅ 3.11×108 people

(1.6)

Cohen calculates this figure as $195 (in 1972 dollars) based on 1972 data (US
health expenditures as $65 billion and US population as 200 million). Accounting for
inflation [24] this is equivalent to $1,071 in 2012 dollars, almost 20% of the value
calculated in Equation(1.6). This is primarily explained by the fact that, accounting for
population increase, total US healthcare expenditures have increased by about 532%
above inflation, 11 which would lead to a value of (5.32 × $195) $1,037 per person-rem
avoided in 1972 dollars or $5,696 in 2012 dollars. Further, increases in health costs could
be influenced by the increase in the mean life expectancy in the US (71.2 years in 1972 to
78.3 years in 2010 [25]). This value of $5,696/person-rem is near the middle between
LANL’s definition of “reasonable” for normal exposures (2000 $/person-rem) and that

11

65 billion 1972 dollars is equivalent to 340 billion 2010 dollars. Taking the ratio of 2012 estimates of
healthcare expenditures ($2.8 trillion) to adjusted 1972 US Healthcare expenditures (340 billion) gives a
value of around 8.24 (824%). The population however has only increased by about 155%. Therefore, the
increase in health care expenditure (independent of population increase) is estimated as 824%/155%=5.32.
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for employees approaching the 2 rem limit (10,000 $/person-rem), thereby providing
some reasonableness to the current Los Alamos values.
There are several problems with using this methodology to set ALARA
parameters in an occupational setting. First, the assumption that the cost of ill-health is
about twice that of the total national expenditure is very rough and unsupported in
Cohen’s paper. Second, implicit in the use of 5-rem/generation in the calculation is that
the cost per person-rem is for the general population exposed through environmental
transport of radionuclides and not plant workers whose exposure would be somewhat
higher, to a maximum of around 30 × 5 = 150 rem/generation. The 30-year/generation is
based on first-generation genetic effects [22] though it is extended to “overall ill-health”
through the assumption that between 5% and 50% of ill-health is proportional to the
mutation rate. Using a value of 20% and a doubling dose (defined as the amount of
radiation needed to double the natural incidence of a genetic or somatic anomaly) of 20
rem [22], the BEIR report calculates that 5 rem per generation would eventually lead to
an increase of 5% of the ill-health of the population. However, as is acknowledged in the
text, this report was written before the significance of radiation-induced cancer incidence
was fully appreciated.
Many estimates of ALARA’s “reasonable” definition are based on subjective
judgments. Perhaps the broadest of these assumptions is that the cost of “ill-health” is
twice that of national healthcare expenditures. This assumption is not present in the 1972
BEIR report where total US healthcare expenditures are used as a “lower bound” for cost
of ill-health. A comprehensive evaluation of the costs associated with “ill-health” is
necessary for the development of a cost of detriment in this fashion and requires detailed
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knowledge of radiation effects at very low doses. The past 40 years has seen great strides
in radiation epidemiology as well as radiation biology, though these advances are not
sufficient to definitively determine the health-care cost associated with one rem.
1.2.3 Review of Dose-Response Models
Radiation Risk Assessment
In an occupational setting, radiation risk assessment typically consists of standard
exposure calculations (using radiation transport codes) or measurements followed by the
application of dose-to-risk conversion factors developed by committees such as the ICRP
or the Committee to Assess the Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing
Radiation (BEIR 12). Thus, this section of the review will be limited to the studies that
have been most influential in the development of these risk estimates. It is noted here that
the Health Physics Society issued a position statement advising against the estimation of
radiation risks below 50 - 100 mSv (5 -10 rem) because at this level “risks of health
effects are either too small to be observed or are non-existent.” [26]
The primary tool used to assess the risks to humans of exposure to ionizing
radiation is epidemiology. Radiation epidemiologists use the term “risk” in two different
ways to describe the associations that are noted in the data: relative risk and absolute risk
[27]. Relative risk (RR) is the ratio of the rate of disease among groups having some risk
factor, such as radiation, divided by the rate among a group not having that factor. Excess
Relative Risk (ERR) is the relative risk minus 1. The second risk metric is the absolute
risk (AR) which is defined simply as the rate of disease among a population. Excess
Absolute Risk (EAR) is the difference between two absolute risks. The RR and ERR,

12

BEIR is an acronym for Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation.
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being dimensionless, have mathematical advantages over the EAR and thus are more
common in risk modeling applications.
Another common risk metric is the standardized mortality ratio (SMR). The SMR
compares the mortality rate in some population against that in the general population
from which the cohort of interest is drawn. An example of this would be a comparison of
cancer mortality in West Virginia Coal Miners to the cancer mortality of West
Virginians. In occupational radiation epidemiology, this metric often demonstrates a
“healthy worker effect” (HWE) that results from lower mortality rates in the exposed
population than in the general population. Metrics such as relative risk eliminate this
effect because they compare exposed “healthy” workers to unexposed “healthy” workers.
The BEIR VII report [27], ICRP 103 [1], and the 2010 report of the UN Scientific
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) [28] have all judged that the
single most informative set of data on whole-body radiation exposure, cancer mortality
and incidence comes from the life-span study (LSS) of the survivors of the 1945 atomic
bombings in Japan. This study has been performed by the Radiation Effects Research
Foundation (RERF) and its predecessor, the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission.
The LSS continues to be a fruitful source of information about the effects of acute
exposure to radiation as new analytical techniques become available [29]. As an example,
in 2004 the RERF implemented an improved code for reconstructing doses in Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. This dosimetry system was updated because reports in the early 1990s on
thermal neutron activation measured in exposed material [30] [31] were interpreted as
suggesting that the then-current survivor dosimetry system might systematically
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underestimate neutron doses for Hiroshima survivors who were more than 1 km from the
hypocenter. While this turned out to not to be the case, the new method showed that the
previous system underestimated the gamma-dose by about 10% leading to an 8%
underestimation in the risk estimates for solid cancer and leukemia [32]. Further, the
large size of the population and the thoroughness of the follow-up allow for the analysis
of less frequent endpoints, such as second cancers, usually prohibited by the small study
size. A 2010 study of the A-bomb survivors found that radiation exposure confers equally
high relative risks of second primary cancers as first primary cancers [33].
The full LSS cohort consists of approximately 120,000 persons who were
identified at the time of the 1950 census. It includes 93,000 persons who were in
Hiroshima or Nagasaki at the time of the bombings and 27,000 subjects who were in the
cities at the time of the 1950 census, but not at the time of the bombings. This later group
has been excluded from most analyses since the early 1970s because of inconsistencies
between their mortality rates and those for the remainder of the cohort [27]. Table 2,
based on the RERF’s study of mortality in the LSS between 950-1997 [34], shows the
distribution of survivors in the LSS cohort by their estimated doses to the colon [32].
The dose to the colon is taken to be the gamma-ray absorbed dose to the colon plus the
neutron absorbed dose to the colon times a weighting factor 10 (to convert it to dose
equivalent). This weighted dose is in units of sieverts.
While the BEIR, ICRP, and UNSCEAR reports base their risk models exclusively on the
results of the LSS, they recognize that acute exposures lead to higher risks than
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protracted exposures. Thus, the LSS-derived risks were modified by a dose and dose-rate
effectiveness factor (DDREF) [35] [27] [1].
Table 2. Number of subjects, solid cancer deaths, and non-cancer disease deaths by
radiation dose

Number of Subjects
Solid Cancer Deaths
(1950-1997)
Non-cancer disease
Deaths

Weighted Colon Dose (Sv)
0.2 0.005 - 1 0.1 - 0.2
0.5
31,650
5,732
6,332

Total

0 (<0.005)

86,572

37,458

9,335

3,833

3,277

668

31,881

13,832

11,633

2,163

0.5 1.0
3,299

1.0 2.0
1,613

488

763

438

274

82

2,423

1,161

506

163

2.0

The DDREF is a factor that divides the LSS risk estimates to account for the
differences in the biological effects produced by differing dose rates. The BEIR VII
committee combined radiobiological and epidemiological evidence concerning DDREF
via a Bayesian statistical analysis. The data sets used were solid cancer in the LSS and
cancer and life shortening in animals. The BEIR VII estimate of the DDREF ranged from
1.1 to 2.3 with a modal value of 1.5. The ICRP used “broad judgments in its choice of
DDREF based upon dose-response features of experimental data, the LSS and the results
of probabilistic uncertainty analysis conducted by others;” [1] their DDREF value was 2.
The UNSCEAR suggested that if the dose-response curve over some dose range of
interest can be approximated by a linear-quadratic function (𝛼𝐷𝑜𝑠𝑒 + 𝛽𝐷𝑜𝑠𝑒 2 ) then the

slope of the high-dose linear approximation at a particular high dose, DH, is 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐻 , the

slope of the low-dose linear approximation is α, and the DDREF corresponding to DH is
their ratio: 1 +

𝛽
𝛼

𝐷𝐻 . Thus, the UNSCEAR value of DDREF represents the curvature of

the linear quadratic model and takes different values for different doses and model
curvatures with values ranging from 1.5 to 7.0 [36].
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The models used to evaluate the cancer risk from the LSS also differ among the
different committees. For UNSCEAR, the shape of the cancer dose response is largely
driven by assumptions made about the shape of the dose-response curve for the initiating
lesion or lesions. In other words, the dose response for cancer is assumed to have the
same shape as the dose response for initial damage. In particular, if the initial damage is a
linear-quadratic function of dose, D, F(D) = σ0 + σ1 – D + σ2 – D2, then the cancer dose
response will also be linear-quadratic, with the same ratio of quadratic-to-linear
coefficients [35].
The risk model preferred by the BEIR VII committee is detailed below. For solid
cancers the excess relative risk (ERR) is given by:
η

*  a 
ERR (e, a ) Solid Cancer
= β s ⋅ D ⋅ eγ e   ,
 60 

(1.7)

where βs is the gender-dependent ERR/Sv at an exposure age of 30 and attained age of
60, e is the age at exposure and e* is

𝑒−30
10

for e < 30 and 0 for e > 30, a is the attained age,

η is the exponent of attained age and γ is the per-decade increase in age at exposure over
the range 0-30 years.
The parameter values for the BEIR VII committee’s preferred model for solid cancer
incidence and mortality are given in Table 3.
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Table 3. ERR Models for estimating incidence of all solid cancers excluding thyroid and
non-melanoma skin cancers and mortality from all solid cancers. Parenthetical values
represent 95% confidence intervals.
Parameters
Incidence
Mortality
Male ERR/Sv (βm)
0.33 (0.24, 0.47)
0.23 (0.15,0.36)
Female ERR/Sv (βf)
0.57 (0.44,0.74)
0.47 (0.34,0.65)
Per-decade Increase in Age at
-0.3 (-0.51,-0.10) -0.56 (-0.80,-0.32)
exposure over the range 0-30 years (γ)
Exponent of attained age (η)
-1.4 (-2.2,-0.7)
-0.67(-1.6,0.26)
The BEIR VII committee selected a linear-quadratic model for leukemia incidence:

ERR( D, s, e, t=
) Leukemia β s ( Dbone + θ D

2
bone

)e

( )

 t 
 t 
γ e* +δ ln   +Φ e* ln  
 25 
 25 

,

(1.8)

where D is dose to the bone marrow in sieverts, and t is time since exposure in years. The
quantities βs, e and e* are the same as above and δ and Φ are fitting parameters and θ is
the curvature parameter taken to be 0.87 per Sv. The parameters used in the BEIR VII
ERR model for leukemia model are given in Table 4.
Table 4. BEIR VII Committee's preferred ERR model for estimating leukemia incidence
and mortality. Parenthetical values are 95% confidence intervals.
Parameter
Male ERR/Sv (βm)
Female ERR/Sv (βf)
Per-decade Increase in Age at
exposure over the range 0-30
years (γ)
δ
φ
Curvature parameter (θ)

Value
1.1
1.2
-0.40 per decade (-0.78,0.0)
-0.48 (-1.1,0.2)
0.42 (0.0,0.96)
0.87 per Sv (0.16,15)

The ICRP, supporting a strict linear, no-threshold model [1] [37], chooses to
present detriment-adjusted nominal risk coefficients for use in a model of the form βD
where β is the risk coefficient and D is the dose. These nominal probability coefficients
for cancer are based upon data on cancer incidence weighted for lethality and life
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impairment. This differs from their previous coefficients, released in ICRP Publication 60
[14], which were based upon fatal cancer risk weighted for non-fatal cancer, relative life
lost for fatal cancers and life impairment for non–fatal cancer. Unlike the BEIR model,
the coefficients are not adjusted for sex or age at exposure. The nominal risk coefficients
are given below in Table 5.
Table 5. Detriment-adjusted nominal risk coefficients (10-2 Sv-1) for stochastic effects
after exposure to radiation at low dose rates [1].
Exposed
Population
Whole
Adult

Cancer (10-2 Sv-1)
ICRP 103 ICRP 60
5.5
6
4.1
4.8

Table 5 presents “detriment-adjusted” nominal risk coefficients. These are defined by the
ICRP as the risks of harmful consequences (in this case cancer) of exposure to ionizing
radiation weighted by the severity of the harm [1].
The basis for the ICRP risk model is presented in Appendix A of ICRP 103. This
appendix includes the rationale for their models as well as some data on which they are
based. Thus, it is possible to derive relative risks (on a per-sievert basis) directly from
their data. For comparisons provided in the later chapters of this work, the relative risks
were calculated by comparing the gender-averaged, all-cancer mortality per sievert to the
gender averaged all-cancer mortality rate among Euro-American unexposed individuals.
This resulted in a relative risk of 1.05 per Sievert (5 × 10-4 ERR/rem).
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Scientific Basis for Various Dose-Response Models
Because of a lack of statistically significant evidence for any particular doseresponse model at the very-low dose range [below 50-100 mSv (5-10 rem) for protracted
exposures or 10-50 mSv (1-5 rem) for acute exposure], risks associated with these low
doses are extrapolated from well-determined studies of higher doses. This literature
review will now focus on the empirical basis for the most-often used dose-response
relationships. In situations where advisory committees have issued position statements
relating to any particular model, reviews of those positions are described. The most
common models are described, and are presented graphically in Figure 1.

LNT

BiologicalEffects

Threshold

Hormesis
LinearQuadratic

Z.E.P

Dose

SupraLinear

Figure 1. Schematic representation of several pertinent (notional) dose response models:
linear, no threshold, linear threshold, hormesis, sublinear, and supralinear. The box to the
left of the abscissa shows the “zero-equivalency point” (ZEP) which is the point at which
there are no radiogenic effects. The sublinear and hormesis models follow the linear
model above certain doses in this plot, though this is not necessarily representative of
reality.
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Linear Dose-Response Relations
At the low and intermediate doses that are amenable to statistically meaningful
analysis, large amounts of data are available, both from epidemiological and laboratory
studies that are consistent with a linear model [38]. This evidence has been analyzed in
detail by the NCRP [39] and, more recently, by the ICRP [37]. The attitudes of both
committees are summed up by the NCRP’s statement in their 2001 report that “no
alternate dose-response relationship appears to be more plausible than the linearnonthreshold model on the basis of present scientific knowledge [39].” At lower doses,
where epidemiological studies require almost impossibly large cohort sizes to make
statistically significant statements, and where experiments are difficult because of
inadequate shielding, biophysical models are valuable for gaining insight into the
fundamental processes governing the cellular response to radiation. The biophysical
rationale for linearity is based on the stochastic nature of radiation interactions. At a
photon dose known empirically to carry an associated probability of detriment, most
irradiated cell nuclei will be traversed by one or, at most, a few physically distant
electron tracks (due to kerma 13). Being so physically distant, it is very unlikely that these
few electron tracks could produce DNA damage in some joint cooperative way; rather,
these electron tracks will act independently to produce stochastic damage and consequent
cellular changes. Because these tracks act independently, decreasing the dose will result
in proportionally fewer tracks which proportionally decrease the risk of detriment [38].
For instance, if a dose with an associated risk is decreased by a factor of ten, the number

13

Kinetic Energy Released in Matter (KERMA) is defined as the expectation value of the energy
transferred to charged particles per unit mass at a point of interest including radiative-loss energy but
excluding energy passed from one charged particle to another [128].

29

of particle tracks would decrease by a factor of ten and the risk would decrease by a
factor of 10.
Supra-linear (Concave) Dose Response
The supra-linear was seen earlier in the discussion of the most current results of
the Life Span Study of the atomic bomb survivors; below around 0.3 Sv (30 rem) from
the atomic bomb, the LSS data for cancer incidence and mortality both exhibit this shape
[40]. These data are shown in Figure 2 which demonstrates the supra linear behavior in
the low-dose range.
There are several interpretations of this dose response model. The first suggests
that there exist small subpopulations of individuals within the total population who are
hypersensitive to radiation [41]. The slope of the dose-response relationship for this
subgroup would be steeper than the linear model used for the remainder of the
population. Thus, in aggregate, the slope of the dose-response relationship would be
somewhere between the normal and radiosensitive populations. No radiosensitive
populations have been identified to date in the frequency and hypersensitivity necessary
to affect a significant deviation from the linear model [38].
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Figure 2. Estimated risks (relative to an unexposed individual) of solid cancer in atomic bomb survivors
exposed to low radiation doses [40]. Data points are placed at the mean of each dose category. The solid
curve represents a weighed moving average of the points shown (dotted curves ± 1 SE) and the dashed
straight line is a linear risk estimate computed from all the data in the dose range of 0-2 Sv. Age-specific
cancer rates from 1958-1994 are used, averaged over follow-up and gender [38].

An additional possible biological mechanism that could be responsible for the
supra-linear model is induced radio-resistance in which a small “priming” dose decreases
the radiosensitivity of the irradiated cells to subsequent larger radiation exposures,
possibly by up-rating DNA repair mechanisms [38]. This has been demonstrated for
carcinogenesis [42] as well as other detrimental cellular effects.
The argument for linearity presented in the previous section assumes autonomous
response for individual cells; it would not necessarily hold if multiple damaged cells
acted cooperatively as has been empirically shown to be the result of radiation bystander
effects [43]. The bystander effect explains the phenomenon of cells not directly hit by a
radiation track being adversely affected. This is thought to be caused by intercellular
signaling from “hit” cells that could potentially induce oncogenic damage to neighboring
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cells. In this case, the cellular response to a dose of ionizing radiation would be
underestimated by the linear model described above.

Linear Threshold Model
The threshold model suggests that there is some dose level below which radiation
has no cellular or biological effects. One of the first arguments for a threshold model was
made by radiation protection pioneer Robley Evans who suggested that, even assuming
the linear, no-threshold model, the latency period for tumorigenesis resulting from doses
below a certain threshold is likely longer than the exposed individual’s remaining
lifespan [44]. An empirical example of a threshold is the lack of an elevated risk of
sarcoma (bone cancer) mortality among the atomic bomb survivors while a statistically
significant increase in carcinomas was observed. Thus, it is thought that a threshold
model is appropriate for sarcoma, though not for carcinoma [45]. An upper limit on a
threshold was estimated for the atomic bomb survivors in 2000 by the radiation effects
research foundation as 0.06 Sv (6 rem) [40]. This was estimated by finding the upper
limit of a 95 percent confidence interval for the dose-intercept of the linear, no threshold
model. Other studies’ estimates of a carcinogenetic threshold value have ranged from 40
mSv to 200 mSv (4 rem- 20 rem) [46].
Some support for the linear threshold model comes from epidemiological studies
comparing populations exposed to varying levels of background radiation. An example
provided in the BEIR V report demonstrates that the population of Guodong Province in
the Peoples’ Republic of China who were exposed to 3-4 mGy (300-400 mrem) per year
experienced no increase in cancer over a control population exposed to around 1 mGy
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(100 rem) per year [47]. A calculation by the BEIR VII committee suggested that,
assuming the linear, no-threshold model, the expected percentage of cancers induced by
the excess background radiation would be 1-2% above the cancers occurring from all
other causes in a lifetime [27]. This is an example of what epidemiologists refer to as an
ecological study, and is not considered sufficient to demonstrate causality. Ecologic
studies compare population data as opposed to individual data; because populations are
likely to differ by more than just the exposure, and confounders cannot be controlled, the
use of these studies is considered highly tenuous. Further, it is unclear if a 1-2%
difference in cancer rates could be detected by epidemiological methods [27].
Hormesis
The basic thesis of hormesis, from a cell-biology perspective, is that the stress
responses activated by low doses of radiation, particularly those that would increase
immunological responses, are more beneficial than any deleterious effects that might
result from the low doses of ionizing radiation [27]. In other words, low doses of
radiation would, under this theory, provide a benefit greater than their associated risk.
This effect has been demonstrated in animal studies [48] where animals exposed to low
and intermediate levels of ionizing radiation experienced increased longevity. In many of
the cases presented in Upton’s review, the increase in longevity was primarily to the
result of a strengthened immune system, and not necessarily a decrease in malignancies.
This suggests that, in these studies, any increase in lifespan would be due to a radiationinduced enhancement of the immune system [49] as opposed to improved DNA-repair
mechanisms [50].
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More recent results suggest that bystander effects, thought by some (as discussed
above) to contribute to a supra-linear dose response, may actually provide a protective
effect to neighboring cells as opposed to damaging them [51] [52].
In epidemiology, the existence of negative associations between dose and risk is
not uncommon in case-control studies. A combined study of cancer mortality at three
DOE facilities engaged in nuclear weapons and plutonium work [53] showed negative
excess relative risks for all cancers and for leukemia [54]. A study of Canadian workers
employed in the nuclear fuel cycle showed a negative trend in cancer mortality with
increasing dose [55]. Other evidence comes from ecologic studies of populations exposed
to high levels of background radiation [56] [57] [58] and domestic radon exposure [59]
[60]. However, as discussed above, the use of ecological studies to infer causation is
questionable.
Convex Dose-Response Relationships (Sublinear)
A convex dose-response relationship suggests that the linear, no-threshold model
overestimates risk at low doses, while underestimating the risk at high doses. This type of
relationship is typically used to describe the acute dose-effect relationship for radiationinduced leukemia in humans [34]. This relationship is also a consequence of current cellsurvival and mechanistic cell-repair models [61], thus demonstrating its compatibility
with radiation biology.
The Practical Application of Dose-Response Models
Estimating the risk associated with human exposure to ionizing radiation is
controversial. The currently accepted basis for risk-based radiation protection is to
assume that risk increases linearly with increasing dose (the linear, no-threshold
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hypothesis) [37]. The logical extension of the linear, no-threshold (LNT) theory is that at
a sufficiently small dose, D, and sufficiently large population size N, exposure of N
people to an average dose D would result in the same number of radiation-related cancers
as exposure of k × N people to an average dose D/k for arbitrary k > 1. The ICRP
emphasizes in this report that the practical significance of this issue is only associated
with doses leading to risks that are high enough to be of ‘legitimate’ concern as
determined by the “usual social and political processes” [37]. This is to say that,
assuming the LNT model, there will be a dose level below which the associated risks are
less than those routinely taken in everyday life. The ICRP’s current recommendations are
based on this concept of “acceptable” risk as is ALARA practice.
The dose level that is considered reasonable, however, would change if the LNT
model was not assumed; a supra-linear model would increase the acceptable dose level
and a linear-threshold or sub-linear model could reduce it. A hormetic model would, in
practice, be equivalent to a threshold model because, below the point where the risks
become positive, radiation exposure would provide a beneficial effect and thus be of no
concern from a radiation-protection standpoint.
Occupational Dose at Los Alamos National Laboratory
For glovebox workers at the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility at TA-55 (PF-4) and
the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building (CMR), incurring dose is a routine
occurrence. The main exposure concern is external dose from neutrons and photons.
However, there is a possibility of radionuclide ingestion in the event of accidental
puncture of glovebox gloves or failure of the ventilation system.
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The previous section examined the history and rationale for national and
international radiation protection standards. Now the focus is narrowed to department of
energy facilities and the rationale for current dose limits.

1.2.4 Design Goals and the Evolution of Occupational Risk
Newly designed DOE radiological facilities have set design goals of 500
mrem/year to the maximally exposed employee [62]. While these are not operational
administrative limits, they do belie a fundamental shift in the philosophy of radiation
protection away from keeping doses ALARA to as low as possible (ALAP). As will be
seen in Chapter 3, it is not uncommon to find facility background doses higher than this
level. One problem that the americium project faces, which motivates the risk-benefit
analysis performed in this work, is that the background dose in the room where the
gloveboxes are located possesses a dose rate equal to (on average) the current design
objective (1 rem/year for a 2,000-h work year).
Were the ALAP philosophy applied to binding administrative limits, it would
undoubtedly increase the costs associated with many operations. While most workers
(around 96% as shown below) receive less than 500 mrem/year, there are a non-trivial
number who historically received greater than this amount. As an illustration, Figure 3
shows the fraction of employees at Los Alamos who have received greater than 100
mrem (the current ICRP recommendation and NRC limit for dose to members of the
general public) and 500 mrem each year since 1990 through 2012. Since 1990, an
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average of 4.3% of the workers receive greater than 500 mrem, an average of 22.7%
receive greater than 100 mrem.
An aspect of this research seeks to evaluate, from an ALARA perspective and
based on the best available data, if this philosophy is reasonable. Before examining this
problem in detail, a historical review of radiation exposure at Los Alamos National
Laboratory is presented.

Figure 3. Fraction of exposed Los Alamos workers exposed to ionizing radiation at doses
exceeding 100 and 500 mrem in a year.

1.2.5 Los Alamos Dose Records and Historical Events
Los Alamos National Laboratory, one of the largest science and engineering
institutions in the world, was home to the Manhattan project to develop the world’s first
atomic bombs. Spencer Weart wrote of uranium in his history of the scientists involved in
the development of the atomic bomb [63]:
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We must be curious to learn how such a set of objects - hundreds of power
plants, thousands of bombs, tens of thousands of people massed in
national establishments - can be traced back to a few people sitting at
laboratory benches discussing the peculiar behavior of one type of atom.

The radiation resulting from the fission and decay of nuclei including Weart’s
“one type of atom” and its consequences have been the source of intense debate and
analysis in the past century. Collective dose (the sum of the doses received across the
entire exposed workforce) at a radiological facility over time can tell the story of the
activities that have occurred. Los Alamos has been maintaining dose records since 1944
that provide an excellent correlation with the history of the Laboratory. Both the trends
and outliers in this data help identify significant events in Los Alamos history as shown
in Figure 4. Significant events were identified using the criterion of a standardized
difference greater than 2 indicating that the dose had changed by more than 2 standard
deviations since the previous year. The standardized difference is given by:
D1 − D2

σ

(1.9)

The primary question in this method is how to choose a standard deviation; Figure
4 demonstrates that there are several significant “eras” in the Laboratory’s history each
with distinct dose profiles. These eras have such different activity profiles that it is
unreasonable to apply the same standard deviation to each. Because one of the most
influential factors in Laboratory activities is the Laboratory director, the differences were
standardized to the standard deviation of mean dose during each director’s tenure. In
doing so, it is possible to identify significant events during an era that may not have
appeared if the standard deviation for the entire history of the Laboratory were used.
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As is discussed above, radiation dosimetry practices were well developed for Xray and radium assessment by the start of the Manhattan Engineer District (MED)
program to develop nuclear weapons in 1940. The primary challenges encountered by the
MED and later by its successor, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), were how to
measure worker dose to external radiation involving neutrons or mixed radiation fields.
Uncertainties in these measurements in the early days of the MED operations at Los
Alamos were accounted for by ORAU when reconstructing the doses reported in the Los
Alamos dose database used for this analysis [64].

Figure 4. Routine (Non-accidental) average doses by year at Los Alamos National
Laboratory. The white boxes at the top show the Laboratory directors’ names. The
colored boxes show the president color-coded by political affiliation (red for republican,
blue for democrat).

As is expected, doses experienced a significant increase between 1944 and 1945
because of the workforce demands of the Manhattan Project. During this time, work
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assignments included performing the final purification of plutonium received at Los
Alamos, reducing plutonium to its metallic state, determining the relevant physical and
metallurgical properties of plutonium and developing weapon component fabrication
technologies [64]. Processes associated with these assignments included nuclear fuel
fabrication, nuclear criticality experimentation, radiochemical separations, refining,
finishing and storing plutonium and various other processing and testing operations. With
the exception of component fabrication, these operations entailed significant exposures to
various types of radiation.
After 1945, when World War II had ended and J. Robert Oppenheimer had left,
the dose began to decrease as the Laboratory began transition to a more general scientific
focus. This changed in 1951 with the first stages of the development of the world’s first
thermonuclear weapon, the Hydrogen Bomb, culminating on November 1, 1952 with the
Ivy Mike shot at Eniwetok.
In 1952, the Rocky Flats Plant opened and some production work was shifted
there from Los Alamos. This is likely a contributor to the downward slope between 1952
and the opening of PF-4 in 1978, when the manufacturing paradigm shifted and people
learned to use the new facility.
Mounting public concern over the Cold War as well as the fallout from nuclear
weapons testing in the mid-1950s [65] led governments to begin discussing the
possibilities of testing bans and moratoriums; Los Alamos doses decreased accordingly.
In 1958, during negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear test ban at the Geneva
Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, the United States, United
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Kingdom, and the USSR agreed upon the first large-scale moratorium on nuclear
weapons testing. During this moratorium, doses decreased sharply and, though they
increased immediately after it expired at the end of 1959, they never returned to the premoratorium levels. From 1960 until the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in
1963, doses steadily decreased to some of the lowest levels the Laboratory has seen.
Though in the years following the PTBT doses appear to fluctuate greatly, they remain
within a reasonable range for the Norris Bradbury era.
In 1970, Norris Bradbury was replaced by Harold Agnew. The Agnew era was
not characterized by the large standard deviations in average dose of the Bradbury era
despite the fact that it saw several important changes to the Laboratory. The early days of
the Agnew era saw the opening of the Los Alamos Meson Physics Facility (LAMPF) in
1972 (currently named the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center, LANSCE). While these
facilities tend to focus more on basic science applications than weapons engineering and
production, they still represent significant exposure risks to the operators, maintenance
technicians, and scientists involved in their operation. No significant trend in the
Laboratory-wide average doses appeared in the five years following the opening of
LANSCE/LAMPF (1972-1977).
One of the most significant events in the recent history of the nuclear weapons
complex was the opening of Plutonium Facility 4 (PF-4) in 1978 which, over thirty years
after its opening, remains the nation’s most advanced plutonium processing facility.
Harold Agnew left the Laboratory the year after PF-4 opened and was replaced by
Donald Kerr. The opening of this facility began the first of several multi-year trends that
characterize the modern Laboratory. From 1978 through around 1989, the utilization of
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PF-4 increased as purified plutonium metal began to be provided to the Rocky Flats
Nuclear Weapons Plant. This increase corresponds directly to an increase in Laboratorywide average dose through 1984. In 1985, Los Alamos’ first ALARA committee was
founded [66], cementing the Laboratory’s commitment to a work-practice philosophy of
justification, optimization and dose limitation, and the acceptance of the new ICRP 26
philosophy [13]. This commitment manifested itself in a significant decrease in doses in
1985. Doses rose sharply in 1986 due partly to the Laboratory’s role in the production of
Pu-238 heat sources and Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators for the Galileo mission
to Jupiter. However, with the exception of 1986, doses have never risen above their preALARA committee levels. An additional factor contributing to the sharp reduction in
dose between 1984 and 1985 was the cessation of the first americium recovery project.
The institution of the ALARA committee may be the most important event of the Donald
Kerr era from a radiation protection perspective. Kerr was replaced in 1986 by Siegfried
Hecker.
In the late 1980s, significant mishandling of chemical and transuranic waste at the
Rocky Flats plant led to heavy fines from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and eventually, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) involvement. On June 6, 1989 the
FBI served the DOE with a search warrant while simultaneously raiding the plant.
Despite no similar mismanagement problems at Los Alamos, programmatic work was
significantly (albeit temporarily) hampered by the introduction of “Tiger Teams”
intended to ensure that Los Alamos was compliant with all government regulations. This
decrease in productivity is evident in Figure 4 where the average dose shows a steep
decline relative to the surrounding years.

42

The more recent history of the Laboratory can be characterized by two large-scale
projects: the production of plutonium heat sources for the Cassini space probe and the pit
manufacturing endeavor. Both of these programs are boxed and labeled in Figure 4. The
departure of Siegfried Hecker coincided with the end of the Cassini program, though no
correlation is implied. Hecker was replaced by John Browne who saw the birth of pit
manufacturing in 2000. From the inaugural year of pit manufacturing (2000) until 2003,
the collective doses increased significantly. In 2003, Browne left the Laboratory and was
replaced by former rear admiral G. Peter Nanos.
In July 2004, during a special inventory associated with an upcoming experiment,
two items of Classified Removable Electronic Media (CREM) were discovered missing
from the Weapons Physics (WP) Directorate [67]. In response, director Nanos suspended
programmatic work at the Laboratory. The following is an excerpt from the email
memorandum sent to all employees [68].
The Senior Executive Team and I have taken the
extraordinary step of broadening the work suspension to
include all activities at the Laboratory. We are doing this as
part of an effort to ensure this Laboratory operates safely
and meets our national security obligations. This action is
not due to lack of confidence in your ability to do your
jobs, nor is it punitive in any way. I'm simply convinced
that we need time to reflect on our shared responsibilities
and on how we do our jobs… I want you to be aware how
serious this situation is, and I will keep you informed about
what will be happening in the next few days. This week I
traveled to Washington D.C. and to Oakland where I met
with our customers, members of Congress, UC Regents and
University management. Frankly, nobody understands how
we have gotten ourselves into this mess. I told them that, in
accordance with our policies, people will be terminated if
they ignore the safety, security and environmental
regulations that are at the core of what we do here. I
emphasized to everyone I met with that this willful flouting
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of the rules must stop, and I don't care how many people I
have to fire to make it stop. If you think the rules are silly,
if you think compliance is a joke, please resign now and
save me the trouble…You may already have seen media
accounts of what individuals are saying about the
Laboratory and these recent events. Perhaps this outside
view will help you understand just how serious this
situation has become…People who believe their dedication
to science or to our mission supersedes our commitments to
safety, security and environmental compliance put us all at
risk. This erroneous belief puts our personal safety on the
job, our nation's security which depends on protecting
classified information, and the institution to which we've
dedicated our careers at risk. After the all-hands meeting, I
received a lot of feedback from you and I appreciate the
time and thoughtfulness you put into your messages. I was
especially gratified by one note in which a group of
employees talked about the "institutional embarrassment"
of the current situation and their collective sense of outrage
at the actions of a tiny minority.
It was later discovered that the missing hard-drives had never existed and that the
scandal was the result of faulty classified-matter accounting practices. The Laboratory
resumed normal operations later that year to major organizational changes [69]. Nanos
stepped down in 2005 and was replaced by Robert W. Kuckuck, who was the last
Laboratory director under the University-of-California-managed Laboratory.
Kuckuck remained as director until June 2006 when the Los Alamos management
contract was awarded to Los Alamos National Security, LLC (LANS) which was made
up predominantly of Bechtel, University of California, Babcock and Wilcox, and URS
Energy and Construction. Michael Anastasio, then head of Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, was named first Laboratory director under LANS effective June 1,
2006. The director-based standard deviations used in the standardized difference
described above monotonically decrease during each director’s tenure from Oppenheimer
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to the Nanos/Kuckuck era. The first increase in standard deviation over previous eras was
in the five years since Los Alamos National Security took over the Laboratory. This is
largely due to a dip in 2008 presumably because of the relocation of much of the
Laboratory’s transuranic waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, NM.
In early 2009, an employee was caught attempting to smuggle roughly $2,000 of
gold shavings out of PF-4 in a sandwich bag when he set off one of the radiation
monitors workers must pass through when exiting the facility [70]. In response, a “twoperson rule” was instituted in PF-4 mandating that no worker can enter PF-4 without an
escort and that no worker is left alone at any time. The two-person rule necessarily
increases the Laboratory’s average dose considering that for any operation with an
associated exposure, the worker’s “second” will receive a dose that they may not have
had. While this correlates in time to a noticeable rise in average dose, the rise is not as
sharp as is associated with some previous events such as the year after the 2004
shutdown.
From this analysis, it is clear that the recorded doses at a facility correlate with the
facility’s work scope and activity. In some ways, the dose database provides the more
reliable history of the Laboratory than any historical report can. The task is to decode the
messages provided.
1.3 Chapter Conclusion
Radiation protection, as a science, is still very new. The recommendations and
regulations governing the low-level exposures typical of occupational settings have
historically depended on the use of broad assumptions and the use of conservative
estimates in the absence of definitive scientific data. While the life-span study of the
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Japanese atomic bomb survivors provides a wealth of information about that particular
cohort, it necessitates the use of dose-and dose-rate effectiveness factors (DDREF) to be
applicable to radiation workers receiving protracted low doses of ionizing radiation.
Further, cultural factors, genetic predisposition to various ailments, and other
confounding factors must be taken into account. Thus, the future of radiation protection
must move away from the current paradigm of calculating risks based on the Life Span
Study and incorporating other information merely in the DDREF.
The purpose of this dissertation is to develop methods for improved estimates of
the risk due to exposure to ionizing radiation and to apply these methods in a novel
manner to the problem of ALARA optimization. Chapter 2 examines the necessity of
homogeneity among cohorts in the development of risk estimates from epidemiological
studies and proposes a method for handling heterogeneous cohorts. Further, this method
is applied to estimate all cancer risk in four Department of Energy nuclear weapons
laboratories.
Chapter 3 develops a radiation exposure assessment for an example process at Los
Alamos National Laboratory and applies the cancer risks developed in Chapter 2 to
estimate whether the change in compensation the worker is paid is commensurate with
the change in risk the worker experiences. This, along with two other methods are
proposed as new paradigms for determining whether staffing requirements result in a
radiation protection scheme that keeps doses as low as reasonably achievable.
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Chapter 2. Radiogenic Cancer Risk: Methodology and Estimation
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this study is to demonstrate that the epidemiological technique of
aggregate pooling is inappropriate for the combination of some seemingly homogeneous
populations, and to develop an alternative method for combining epidemiological studies.
Further this work applies this technique to the case of occupational radiation exposure to
develop all-cancer risk estimates for Department of Energy weapons-laboratory workers.
Scientific understanding of the risks due to exposure to ionizing radiation has
improved over the years because of advances in radiobiology and epidemiological studies
of exposed populations. However, determination of the risks from exposure to low doses
of ionizing radiation is difficult because both the cohorts and the biological risks are
small and will likely be confounded by environmental or lifestyle factors such as
smoking or genetic disposition to various health conditions. Epidemiological techniques
such as the pooling of different populations into one study can increase the statistical
power of risk estimates in situations where the exposed population is too small to allow
differentiation between dose effects and confounding factors. However, as this work will
demonstrate, if the populations being examined do not show sufficient homogeneity
between them (including between the exposed and unexposed populations) pooling can
lead to erroneous results. Often, when studies are pooling diverse populations, care is
taken to define groups that possess a high degree of homogeneity. An example of this
approach to pooling is the 15-country study of nuclear workers [71]. The 15-country
study examined epidemiological data from 15 countries and included both weapons
laboratory workers and commercial nuclear power workers and significant effort was
made to ensure that workers were grouped homogeneously. The death rates within these

48

groups are then compared to national death rates to calculate standardized mortality ratios
(SMR), where homogeneity is practically impossible. As expected with SMR estimates
of nuclear workers, a healthy-worker effect is seen. When the cancers deaths were
stratified by dose and fit to a linear excess relative risk (ERR) model using Poisson
regression, statistically significant positive correlations were seen [72], likely due to the
choice of a linear model. The results from this study are not easily summarized and thus a
table is not presented here.
Many of the epidemiological studies of nuclear weapons laboratory workers
exposed to radiation in an occupational setting have focused on internal exposure to
plutonium [73] [74], [75]. This has been especially true of studies concerning Los
Alamos National Laboratory [76] [77] [78] [79]. One of the most interesting studies has
been the 50-year follow-up of 26 Manhattan Project workers exposed to internally
deposited plutonium [80] [81] [82] [83] [84]. The workers were examined periodically
between 1971 and 1994. Their effective doses ranged from 0.1 to 7.2 Sv with a median
value of 1.25 Sv [80]. By the end of the study, seven individuals had died, which was less
than half of the expected 16 deaths predicted by a survey of the US population. Their
death rate was also lower than unexposed workers employed at Los Alamos National
Laboratory over the same period of time. Eight of the twenty-six workers had been
diagnosed as having one or more cancers, which was within the expected range. The
underlying cause of death in three of the seven deceased persons was from cancer,
namely cancer of prostate, lung, and bone. Mortality from all cancers was not statistically
elevated [84].
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Many of these studies reported exposure data for internal and external dose,
though the ultimate goal of the study was to gain a further understanding of the effects of
plutonium on the human body. Few studies have focused exclusively on exposure to
external sources of ionizing radiation in these populations [53] [85] [54]. The lack of
studies examining external exposure in the (approximate) absence of internal
contamination is likely due to small cohort sizes (made smaller by the exclusion of
workers with measureable levels of internal contamination) and low-level exposures [86].
Thus, many of these studies use methods, such as pooling, to combine the results from
cohorts that are approximately similar across several dimensions such as socio-economic
status and racial makeup. As this work will show, latent heterogeneities between the
populations can affect the results of epidemiological analysis. Thus, to avoid a
“heterogeneity bias,” risk metrics that compare the exposed and unexposed populations in
each study must be calculated first and then combined in a statistically appropriate way.
Thus, this work presents a hypothesis-testing procedure that will allow for the
evaluation of homogeneity between the studies as well as an alternative method for the
combination of studies of heterogeneous populations. This methodology is based on the
statistical method of Whitehead and Whitehead [87] applied to regression analysis as well
as the combination of dose-bin-average relative risks.
2.2 Background
Occupational radiation epidemiology studies provide important insight into the
macroscopic effects of exposure to low levels of ionizing radiation in humans. Oak Ridge
Associated Universities (ORAU) along with the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and
Education maintains a database of both raw and processed epidemiological data from
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published studies called the Comprehensive Epidemiological Data Resource (CEDR)
[88]. The datasets contained in CEDR were collected and combined using two methods to
compare current risk models to estimate the risk to the workers. Combining studies is
especially important in radiation epidemiology where cohorts are often too small to infer
statistically significant conclusions.
Each of the studies considered in this work, represents socio-economically similar
cohorts in that studies of DOE workers in similar facilities are similar in education, age,
and race [53]. Radiation workers at Department of Energy facilities tend to be relatively
well educated, have good health insurance, have a high standard of occupational safety,
and have government security clearances. These factors, in part form the basis of a
healthy worker effect, which has been used to explain the low mortality rates among
workers exposed to ionizing radiation [89]. While the security clearance does not
contribute to factors such as diet or exercise level, the background investigations and
continual drug and alcohol screening reduce two common factors for ill health.
Changes in dosimetry technology over time present a significant challenge to the
radiation epidemiologist. Though a quantitative analysis of the effects of dosimetry
techniques on personnel dose records is beyond the present analysis, the predominant
dosimetry technology used to develop the dose records is noted in each section. This
work is intended to present the risks from external ionizing radiation. Though efforts
were made to exclude any employee with a possible internal exposure, unreported
internal exposures are possible and should be considered where relevant. The majority of
the doses were recorded using film dosimeters (Los Alamos doses were only recorded in
this manner). Those doses not recorded with film dosimeters were recorded using
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thermo-luminescent dosimeters (TLDs). Removal of the TLD data was considered, but it
was found that a significant fraction of the three study populations using TLDs in the
1970s and 80s had some dose recorded in this fashion, thus removal would have severely
reduced the size of the data pool.
National and International scientific committees have been estimating the risks
from the exposure of human beings to radiation for many decades and recommending
models the assessment of radiation risk [37] 14 [28] [90]. The risk estimates and models
are largely based on studies of the Japanese atomic bomb survivors [91]. This data set
provides a wealth of information about high-dose exposures, but little about low, chronic,
doses as seen in an occupational setting. The typical methodology, however, is to perform
a linear extrapolation from the high-dose range down to zero dose, where a risk value of
zero is forced [90]. This is referred to as the linear, no-threshold model. As is discussed
in both the ICRP and BEIR reports cited above, this model has been hotly debated over
the last 40 years because of its disagreement with many toxicological and
epidemiological studies of the effects of low-dose exposure data [37].
The results of the hypothesis testing developed in this work show that even for
populations that are seemingly homogeneous in terms of socioeconomic status,
statistically significant variations in the baseline cancer rates between each study are
found. Thus, while risk estimates developed for Japanese atomic bomb survivors are very
instructive about the effects of radiation on a large population of Japanese individuals, it
is less useful as a tool to assess the risks of a small group of individuals who are unlikely
14

Though the ICRP does have other committees that suggest radiation dose limits, this report and the other
two here cited only recommend models for assessing radiation risk at low doses. The ICRP was used as the
basis to develop radiation protection recommendations made in ICRP 103 [1].
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to have much in common with them genetically, culturally, or socioeconomically. Further
uncertainty is introduced by the difference in dose rate seen by the A-bomb survivors as
opposed to those seen by occupational radiation workers [90].
2.3 Methods
This work develops a method of combining epidemiological cohorts that serves as
an alternative to aggregate pooling. It is applied to two different methods of assessing
risk: regression and dose-bin averaging.
2.3.1 Risk Estimates
Internal comparisons of exposed healthy workers to unexposed healthy workers
normalize the healthy worker effect, allowing for clearer examination of direct exposure
effects. The data are treated as cohort studies and thus the effective measure is the
relative risk (RR):

=
RR

P(death | exposed)
a/c
=
P(death | unexposed) b / d

(1.10)

Where a is the number of cases of a biological endpoint (in the case of this study, death
as the result of cancer) in the exposed group, b is the number of cases in the unexposed
group, c is the number of exposed workers and d is the number of unexposed workers.
Using these quantities, a point estimate of the standard deviation of the natural logarithm
of the relative risk can be found (based on a Taylor series approximation [92]) as [93]:

SD ln ( RR=
)

Thus the variance is estimated by:
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1 1
.
+
a b

(1.11)

Var ln ( RR ) =

1 1
+
a b

(1.12)

This research uses studies based on DOE workers (and contractors) exposed to
ionizing radiation as the backdrop for the comparison of methods for weighting and
combining the relative risk. The data is crude 15 in the sense that there is no stratification
according to socio-economic status, race, or education; it is assumed that within each
study, the exposed and unexposed cohorts are similar with respect to these factors. The
relative risks from each study are stratified by dose into bins containing roughly the same
number of exposed individuals. The number and size of the dose bins chosen reflects the
number beyond which, when the data were pooled, at least one bin had zero deaths. For
dose-bin averaging, the same bin size was maintained for each study. For the regression
analysis, the same number of bins was maintained though the size of the dose bin varied
from study to study.
Regression
The linear model is given by:
ln (=
RR ) b facility ⋅ Dose ,

(1.13)

where RR refers to the relative risk at each dose level and bfacility is the regression or
exposure-response parameter. This model is similar to the model used in Lubin and Boice
Jr.’s meta-analysis of the risks associated with residential radon exposure [94], which was
scaled to account for the baseline radon exposure of their control group. In the present
case, the control group baseline is assumed to be zero and, as is shown in the hypothesis

15

“Crude data” is an epidemiological term implying lack of stratification in the data set. This data is not
strictly crude in that it is stratified by dose.
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testing section, homogeneous with the exposed group. This model will be fit to the data
from each facility and then combined using the methods described below.
Dose-bin Averaging
Dose-bin averaging is a technique that stratifies the exposed populations from
each facility into dose bins of a specific width in which the relative risk is calculated.
Thus the relative risk is averaged over that dose bin. When using the methods described
below as an alternative to pooling, the dose-bins can be calculated using the pooled data
set to ensure an approximately equal number of exposed individuals in each bin.
Assessing Suitability of Data Sets for Pooled Analysis: Hypothesis Testing
Epidemiological data describing a biological endpoint, such as cancer death, can
be described as a set of Bernoulli trials; thus, such data follows a binomial distribution
[92]. The ratio of the number of observed cases of the endpoint to the total number of
individuals in the study is treated as the binomial probability that the endpoint will occur.
When this ratio is compared with the same ratio from another data set, a statistic, the zscore, describing the similarity of the two ratios can be calculated that follows a standard
normal distribution. Comparing this z-score with its value in the standard normal
distribution will result in the probability that the two ratios are identically distributed.
This hypothesis can then be rejected (or not) at whatever confidence level the analyst
desires. When the ratios from two epidemiological control groups are compared, the
comparability of the two groups can be assessed; if the control groups are not similar,
each cannot be directly compared to the other study's exposed group. Performing this
type of hypothesis testing will provide a quantitative criterion for the decision to pool
epidemiological data. Further, the results of the hypothesis testing will support the
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philosophy that applying risk estimates that were calculated for one population to a
culturally, racially, and geographically dissimilar population will likely result in
misleading conclusions unless the dissimilarities are accounted for in some way. The
unexposed populations were examined for homogeneity using a hypothesis test for the
similarity of binomial ratios as follows.
Consider the null hypothesis:
H0: pfacility = ppooled
versus the alternative hypothesis:
H1 : pfacility ≠ ppooled .
The z-score tests statistic for the null hypothesis is [95]:

z -score =

pˆ facility − pˆ pooled
 1
1
pˆ (1 − pˆ ) 
+
n
 facility n pooled





,

(1.14)

where

pˆ =

X facility + X pooled
n facility + n pooled

(1.15)

is the estimate of the common proportion under the null hypothesis and Xfacility/pooled and
nfacility/pooled are the number of observed cancer deaths and total population in either the
facility or the pooled data set, respectively.
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When combining cohort studies, if the unexposed groups are heterogeneous as
determined by this hypothesis test, they should not be pooled. Rather, internally
consistent estimates of the risk to the exposed group (such as the relative risk) should be
calculated and then combined. In recent years, a significant body of literature on research
synthesis, also called meta-analysis, has developed [96]. A meta-analysis is a quantitative
literature review in which results of previously published studies can be combined to
improve the statistical power of their conclusions. Perhaps the most common method for
combining results, or effect sizes in the parlance, is to weight each study by the inverse of
its variance [97] and take the weighted average of all studies. In situations where the risk
estimates are not homogeneous between the studies, (analogous to combining mass
measurements from different balances) the error must be characterized using a random
effects model. The consequence is that, for data described by a random effects model,
weighting the studies by the inverse of their variance requires applying a correction factor
to the estimate of the variance [87]. Methods to achieve this have previously been
developed for the combination of regression parameters [94] [87].
The new statistical methodology proposed in this study was applied to estimate
the fatal cancer from occupational external radiation exposure averaged over stratified
dose bins. This was achieved by calculating the relative risk of radiation exposure from
radiation epidemiology data collected from four U.S. Department of Energy laboratories
and combining them in the manner described below. This produces an estimate of fatal
cancer risk that is specific to the populations studied. Data were gathered from the
Comprehensive Epidemiological Data Resource [4] for four Department of Energy
laboratories engaged in nuclear weapons research and development. These include, Los
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Alamos National Laboratory [98], the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant [99], the
Hanford Site [100], and Oak Ridge National Laboratory [101]. Both dose-bin averaged
and linear, no-threshold estimates were calculated. The preferred cancer-risk estimate in
this situation is the relative risk, which compares the probability of death in the exposed
group in a given cohort to the probability of death in the unexposed group in the same
cohort, thus accounting for factors such as background radiation and other environmental
confounders. Because the focus of this work is methodology, only mortality from all
cancers was considered.
The combination method was based on meta-analytical techniques developed for
the combination of results from randomized clinical trials. The concepts of homogeneity
and heterogeneity in the context that follows differs from those relating to the
homogeneity of studies discussed in the hypothesis testing section above. In this case,
heterogeneity refers to a statistically significant effect produced by exposure to dose. In
the previous context, heterogeneity refers to the makeup of a population, including
socioeconomic status, geographic factors, racial distribution, and other latent factors that
affect the results of the hypothesis testing.
2.3.2 Assessing Effect-Size Homogeneity: Fixed and Random Effects Models
Before the data sets can be combined, the homogeneity of the exposure-response
parameters must be assessed. This will determine whether a fixed- or random-effects
model 16 is appropriate. In the following, βi , j represents the true effect size in study i and
dose-bin j, and bˆi , j represents the estimate of βi , j in study i and dose-bin j.

16

A fixed effects model, meaning that the systematic error is fixed, is analogous to taking many
measurements on a single instrument (such as a balance). A random-effects model implies that the
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Fixed-Effects Model
For a fixed-effects model, it is assumed that the exposure-response parameters
from each study are normally distributed as 17 bˆi , j ~ N(βi,j,1/wi), then

(

)

bˆi , j wi , j ~ N bˆi , j wi , j , wi . Under the null hypothesis that H0,i,j: β i , j = 0 (implying no effect in

each dose bin and each study) bˆi , j wi , j is distributed as bˆi , j wi , j ~ N ( 0, wi ) . Under the
combined null hypothesis, H0: bˆ1, j ,… bˆk , j = 0 it is found that

∑ bˆ

i, j

i

wi , j ~ N ( 0, ∑wi , j ) .

(1.16)

Thus, the test statistic for each dose bin is:

 ˆ

 ∑ bi , j wi , j 

Uj =  i
∑ wi, j

2

(1.17)

i

follows a χ2 distribution with one degree of freedom. In a meta-analysis, U can be used as
a test statistic for H0. Assuming the homogeneity of treatment effects over all k studies in
each dose bin, i.e., β1,j = … = βk,j = β j , then,

∑bˆ

i, j

wi , j ~ N ( β j ∑wi , j , ∑wi , j ) ,

(1.18)

and the true summary statistic β j can be estimated by bˆ j given by:

systematic error is randomly distributed. This is analogous to taking one measurement on many different
instruments that measure the same quantity.
17
In statistical notation, the tilde ( ~ ), denotes that a quantity follows a given distribution. Hence X ~
N(0,1) should be read X follows a standard normal distribution with mean of 0 and variance of 1.
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bˆ j =

∑w bˆ
∑w

i, j i, j

(1.19)

i, j

Where bˆ j is the weighted-regression parameter for dose bin j. The variance is given by:

∑i w var(bˆi, j )
=
var bˆ j 
=
2
 
( ∑wi, j )
2
i, j

 wi2, j 
∑i  w 
 i, j 
=
2
( ∑wi, j )

1
∑wi, j

(1.20)

Random-Effects Model
For a random-effects model, assume that the relative risk values calculated in
each of the m dose bins from the raw data for each of the k studies (b1,1 … bk,m) are an
independent sample from a normal distribution (in each dose-bin across all studies) with
mean βj and variance τ 2j denoted as βi,j ~ N(βj, τ 2j ), and that each study- and dose-binspecific estimate ( bˆi , j ) is normally distributed with mean βi,j and variance 1/wi,j, thus
bˆi , j ~ N(βi,j,1/wi). Because βi,j is normally distributed as N(βj, τ 2j ), marginally, the estimate

is distributed as bˆi , j ~ N(βj,1/wi+ τˆ 2j ). An estimator of the exposure-response parameter is
given by:

bˆ*j

∑w b
=
∑w

*
i, j i, j

i

*
i, j

,

i

wi*, j
where =

(w

−1
i, j

−1
+ τˆ 2j ) and the variance of the summary estimate bˆ j is then
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(1.21)

 wi*, j 2 
∑i  w* 
 i, j  =
2
( ∑wi*, j )

w ) var(bˆi*, j )
(
∑
i
var bˆ*j  =
=
2
 
( ∑wi*, j )
* 2
i, j

1
=
∑ wi*, j

∑ (w

1

−1
i, j

+ τˆ 2j )

(1.22)

The test statistic for homogeneity can be calculated as follows. The hypothesis test for
homogeneity using the test statistic Q (which has an approximate χ2 distribution with K-1
degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis of homogeneous log relative risks across
studies) is a test of whether the variance of the of the estimators in each bin across all
studies ( τ 2j ) is equal to zero:

H 0 :τ j 2 = 0

(1.23)

Should the estimate of τ 2j , denoted τˆ 2j be less than or equal to zero, a fixed-effect
analysis is more appropriate because a zero or negative τ 2j occurs when Q < K-1 (which
is the conditional expectation value of Q if τ 2j =0) implying that the studies are not
homogenous. If τ 2j ≥ 0 a random effects model is appropriate. An estimate of τ 2j can be
found as follows. The test statistic for homogeneity Q in each dose bin is given by a
weighted sum of squares of the deviations:

(

) ∑ w (bˆ

Qj =
wi , j bˆi , j − bˆ j
∑=
i

2

i, j

i

so that:
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i, j

−βj

) −  ∑ w  (bˆ − β )
2

i, j

i

j

j

2

(1.24)



E (Q j ) =∑ wi , j var(bˆi. j ) −  ∑ wi , j  var(bˆ j ) =
i
 i

,

τ 2j ∑wi2, j 

 1
−1
2
∑i wi, j (wi, j + τ j ) −  ∑i wi, j   w +
2
 ∑ i , j ( ∑wi , j ) 

(1.25)

which simplifies to


∑wi2, j
E (Q) = (k − 1) + τ 2j  ∑wi , j −

∑wi, j



 .


(1.26)

Rearranging, it is found:

τ j2 =

E (Q) − ( K − 1)
wi2, j )
(
∑
∑wi, j − w
∑ i, j

(1.27)

Because the expected value is the first sample moment [102], the moments-method
estimator of τ 2j , denoted τˆ 2j is given by:

τˆ j 2 =

Q − ( K − 1)
wi2, j )
(
∑
∑wi, j − w
∑ i, j

(1.28)

2.3.3 Data Sets
Four groups and respective control groups were selected from the CEDR database
for combination; Los Alamos National Laboratory [98], the Rocky Flats Plant [99], the
Hanford Site [100], and Oak Ridge National Laboratory [101]. The data presented here
omits workers with reported internal exposure. Given the changes in dosimetry models
over the years, comparing data over the span of 30 years or more could be considered
suspect. In general, however, it has been judged that the recorded doses in these studies
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were a “reasonable” estimate of the deep dose (1 cm) [103] [53]. In this study, the
relative risk is the preferred risk estimator. Because this quantity compares the exposed
population to the unexposed population at the same site (Los Alamos, Rocky Flats, etc.),
natural exposure to background radiation can be excluded from the analysis as both the
exposed and unexposed are likely to experience, on average, the same background dose
rate and accumulation.
Each of these studies presents its own inherent uncertainties. By returning to the
raw data, considering only external dosimetry and by using the relative risk metric,
attempts have been made in this study to minimize some of these uncertainties (changes
in dosimetry models healthy worker effect, etc.). However, factors such as chemical
exposure and uncertainty in the dosimetry measurements were not considered (primarily
because of lack of information), though they could affect the results. In all cases, gender,
ethnicity, and change in dosimetry technology or modeling are not considered.
A summary of relevant information about each data set is presented in Table 6
including, for each data set, total number of workers involved in each data set, number of
workers exposed and unexposed, exposure period and length of follow-up period.
Table 6. Cohort details for each of the four studies considered in this work.

LANL
Rocky
Hanford
ORNL

Total # of
Workers

Exposed

Unexposed

Exposure
Period

6,168
9,490
26,013
15,185

2,368
4,489
23,659
10,783

3,800
5,001
2,354
4,402

1943-1977
1951-1989
1944-1978
1944-1982
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Length
of
Follow
up
(years)
50
41
50
40

In the section describing each data set, a histogram is presented showing the
frequency distribution for doses in the highest dose bin. This is presented because the
highest dose bin is also the widest in terms of its edges. Further, for each data set, the
doses in this bin are highly skewed and in many cases, the maximum dose is a relative
outlier.
Considerable effort was made by the original authors of each study to choose
control groups that closely approximated the exposed population in race, age, and
socioeconomic status. Details about control group selection are found in the published
studies based on these references. Sources of uncertainty in dosimetry are presented
where available. A more thorough treatment of these errors and their implications for risk
assessment are found in the peer-reviewed studies based on the data sets used in this
work. The fraction of unexposed workers who died of fatal cancer for each facility (and
pooled) is shown in Table 7.
Table 7. Fraction of fatal cancers among unexposed workers at various facilities.
Facility
LANL Rocky Hanford ORNL Pooled
Fatal Cancer Fraction 0.0707 0.0338 0.0930 0.0657 0.060102
Los Alamos Data Set
The first data set was from a study of workers at Los Alamos National Laboratory
[98]. The study for which this data was originally intended was designed as a cohort
study for examining health detriment in workers with internal exposures to plutonium as
compared to unexposed workers and those exposed only to external ionizing radiation.
Film dosimeters were used for the majority of personnel monitoring from 1944 through
the end of 1979 (after the last exposure considered), when they were replaced with
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thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs). Formal bioassay programs to monitor for internal
exposures were begun in 1944. Both external and internal radiation exposure data were
available for all members of the study.
For use in the present work, workers with measurable amounts of internal
radionuclide deposition were omitted from this and all other datasets. If workers had the
potential for internal contamination by radionuclides (as reported in the published data
set), but had body burdens too low to measure, they were excluded from the data set.
Figure 5 shows a stair plot of the relative risk stratified into eight equal-percentage dose
bins for the Los Alamos data (henceforth dose-binned relative risks). In all cases, the
variance is estimated by equation (1.12) . In the context of the relative risk estimates, the
“variance” column in the following tables refers to the variance of the relative risk
estimate in each dose bin.
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Figure 5. Stair plot of the relative risks for the Los Alamos National Laboratory data set
stratified into eight dose bins.
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Table 8 representing the details of the Los Alamos Data set. Further, a histogram
showing the frequency distribution of doses in the highest bin is presented in
Table 8. Details of Los Alamos Data Set

Maximum
Dose (rem)

Died

0.03
0.07
0.17
0.41
1.08
2.52
5.31
109.11

41
29
16
6
15
11
15
25

Total
Relative
Exposed
Risk
547
373
268
222
256
250
246
206

1.059
1.098
0.843
0.382
0.828
0.622
0.861
1.714

95% Confidence
Interval
0.025
0.975
0.7709 1.4543
0.7527 1.6026
0.5093 1.3966
0.1697 0.8590
0.4918 1.3932
0.3398 1.1369
0.5115 1.4507
1.1320 2.5964

Figure 6. Frequency distribution of doses in highest dose bin for Los Alamos data set.
Hanford Data Set
The second dataset represented workers from the Hanford site [100], and was the
largest study. Being the largest dataset considered, the Hanford results have the most
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complete dose spectrum. The primary exposure agents were tritium, plutonium,
americium, cesium, curium, europium, promethium, and strontium. A stair plot of the
dose-binned relative risks is shown in Figure 7. Dose records were collected using film
badges and, in the 1970s, TLDs [103].
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Figure 7. Histogram of the relative risks for the Hanford site data set stratified into eight
dose bins.
Details of the Hanford data set are shown in Table 9. A histogram of the frequency
distribution of doses in the highest (and widest) bin is shown in Figure 8.
Table 9. Details of Hanford Data Set
Maximum
Dose (rem)

Died

0.12
0.30
0.65
1.33
2.67
4.87
11.52
197.75

97
171
170
210
321
356
335
343

Total
Relative
Exposed
Risk
2951
2963
2958
2957
2957
2958
2957
2958

0.35
0.62
0.62
0.76
1.17
1.29
1.22
1.25
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95% Confidence
Interval
0.025
0.975
0.2886 0.4325
0.5317 0.7237
0.5293 0.7210
0.6637 0.8780
1.0399 1.3093
1.1589 1.4440
1.0876 1.3634
1.1146 1.3938

Figure 8. Frequency distribution for doses in the Hanford data set.
Rocky Flats Data Set
The third dataset is from the Rocky Flats Plant [99]. A stair plot of the dosebinned relative risks is shown in Figure 9. Chemical exposure data, also from CEDR
shows that workers were exposed to significant levels of known carcinogens such as
carbon tetrachloride (CCl4) [104]. The levels at which the workers were exposed to
carcinogens and their associated risks were not considered quantitatively in the present
study. Doses were recorded using film badges through 1970 when they were replaced by
TLDs [105].
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Figure 9. Histogram of the relative risks for the Rocky Flats data set stratified into eight
dose bins.
Details of the Rocky Data set are shown in Table 10 . Figure 9 shows the
frequency distribution of doses in the highest (and widest) bin.
Table 10. Details of the Rocky Flats Plant Data Set
Maximum
Dose (rem)

Died

0.057
0.164
0.333
0.619
1.097
2.093
5.474
72.486

18
25
21
31
25
34
27
32

Total
Relative
Exposed
Risk
562
558
563
561
561
562
560
562

0.948
1.326
1.104
1.635
1.319
1.790
1.427
1.685

69

95% Confidence
Interval
0.025
0.975
0.5928 1.5154
0.8881 1.9792
0.7140 1.7063
1.1390 2.3476
0.8834 1.9685
1.2664 2.5307
0.9697 2.0992
1.1800 2.4059

Figure 10. Histogram of the frequency distribution of doses in the highest bin for the
Rocky Flats data set.

Oak Ridge National Laboratory Data Set
The final dataset included in this analysis is based on workers at Oak Ridge
National Laboratory (ORNL) at the K-25, X-10, and Y-12 sites [101]. The primary
exposure agents were uranium and fission products. The workers considered in this study
were also exposed to known carcinogens such as asbestos as well as lead, beryllium, and
organic solvents, though exposure levels are not presented along with the data and risks
because they are not considered in this study. Regarding errors in dose records, this
study found an upward bias in dose-response coefﬁcients and likelihood ratio test
statistics. However, this study only considered missing dose records and did not consider
measurement and other dosimetry errors. For exposures between 1944 and 1980, doses
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were recorded by film badges. In 1980, film badges were replaced with TLDs [106]. A
stair plot of the relative risks in this data set are shown in Figure 11.
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Figure 11. Histogram of the relative risks for the Oak ridge National Laboratory data set
stratified into eight dose bins.
Details of the Oak Ridge data set are shown in Table 11. A histogram showing the
frequency distribution in the highest (and widest) dose bin is shown in Figure 12.

Table 11. Details of Oak Ridge Data Set
Maximum
Dose (rem)

Died

0.039
0.109
0.25
0.583
1.155
2.116
4.461
108.555

95
105
92
103
90
88
70
74

Total
Relative
Exposed
Risk
1265
1419
1364
1341
1350
1347
1349
1348

1.19
1.17
1.07
1.22
1.06
1.03
0.82
0.87
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95% Confidence
Interval
0.025
0.975
1.4648
0.9654
1.4286
0.9610
1.3191
0.8648
1.4861
0.9954
1.3067
0.8528
1.2834
0.8338
1.0448
0.6462
1.0984
0.6879

Figure 12. Histogram of the frequency distribution of doses in the highest dose bin in the
Oak Ridge National Laboratory Data set.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Evaluation of Facility Homogeneity
Comparison of each facility with the pooled population
The results of the hypothesis testing for comparing each facility’s unexposed
population and the pooled unexposed population demonstrates that the null hypotheses
that the Los Alamos, Rocky Flats and Hanford populations are identically distributed
with the pooled unexposed population can be rejected above the p = 0.05 level. For the
Oak Ridge data set, this null hypothesis cannot be rejected at this level. The results are
shown in Table 12. This result implies that, when pooled, the unexposed population from
all facilities does not accurately describe the unexposed populations from three of the
facilities. Thus, there are latent factors in each population that will bias the outcome of
the pooled analysis and the data sets should not be combined using this method.
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Table 12. Results of hypothesis tests to determine homogeneity between the individual
control groups and pooled control groups.
Common
Facility
z-score p-value
𝑝̂
Proportion
Los Alamos 0.071 0.071

2.446

0.0200

Rocky Flats 0.034 0.058
Hanford
0.093 0.069
Oak Ridge 0.063 0.065

-7.179 2.56x 10-12
6.065 4.11x 10-9
0.7482 0.302

Homogeneity Between Each Facility
Hypothesis testing of the four data sets described above has found that, while the
null hypothesis that Los Alamos and Oak Ridge unexposed data sets are identically
distributed cannot be rejected (at the p = 0.05 level), the same null hypothesis for every
other combination of studies can be rejected. Thus, when calculating relative risks, no
unexposed population among these facilities is suitable for use as a baseline against
which to calculate relative risk for all the populations, separately or pooled. Each facility
must be compared against its own unexposed populations. The results of these hypothesis
tests are shown in Table 13.

Table 13. Results of hypothesis testing comparing the unexposed populations between
facilities.
Common
Facility Combination
Proportion z-score
p-value
Los Alamos- Rocky Flats
0.0498
7.905
1.07E-14
Los Alamos –Hanford
0.0793 -3.139
0.0029
Los Alamos –Oak Ridge
0.0793
1.382
0.1535
Rocky Flats- Hanford
0.0528
-10.6
1.56E-25
Rocky Flats- Oak Ridge
0.0475 -6.676
8.36E-11
Hanford – Oak Ridge
0.0736
4.483
1.73E-05
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2.4.2 Regression Analysis - Linear, No Threshold Model
The relative risks for each study have been calculated separately, and generalized
linear regression was performed on each. The regression parameters were combined
using a method similar to that described above, but for only one “j” bin. These results are
plotted in Figure 13.
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Figure 13. Comparison of linear, no-threshold estimates of risk. The summary estimate
developed by this work nearly overlaps with the BEIR VII estimate which takes a
DDREF of 2.
The risk in ERR/rem using the method developed in this paper is compared with that
developed by other committees in Table 14:
Table 14. Excess Relative Risk (ERR) per rem for each study

Estimate
(ERR/rem)

Present Work

ICRP-103

BEIR-VII
(DDREF of
1.5)

BEIR-VII
(DDREF of 2)

2.14 x 10-3
with 95% CI (-0.0145 ,
0.0188

5.0 x 10-4

2.51 x 10-3

1.83 x 10-3
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Several assumptions were necessary in calculating the BEIR VII linear risk
estimates. The BEIR VII committee calculates relative risk for each sex and adjusts it
based on age at first exposure (up to 30) and attained age (up to 60). This work assumed
that all exposures occurred at or after the age of 30 and that the risk was estimated for
workers above 60. Further, the proportion of each sex of the exposed population was
assessed and then a weighted average was calculated, as shown in Table 15.
Using these fractions to weight the male and female contributions to relative risk
(0.23 and 0.47 ERR/Sv, respectively) provides the BEIR VII estimates that were shown
in Table 14. These BEIR VII risks are for solid cancers; the BEIR VII leukemia model is
linear-quadratic and only applies to the 5-year period after the exposure.
Table 15. Sex distribution of workers exposed to external ionizing radiation in the four
studies examined in this work.
Male
Female
Study Size
Facility
Fraction
Fraction
weight
Los Alamos
1.0
0
0.06
Hanford
0.71
0.29
0.57
Rocky Flats
0.89
0.11
0.11
ORNL
0.46
0.54
0.26
TOTAL
0.68
0.32

The ICRP-103 estimate of ERR/Sv was calculated from Tables A.4.1, A.4.11 and A.4.12
in the report. This alternate calculation was done because the commission’s preferred
estimate, the “detriment adjusted nominal risk coefficient” is not an appropriate quantity
with which to compare the Excess Relative Risk. The ICRP’s ERR/Sv value reported in
Table 14 is sex-averaged and includes leukemia mortality. The differences between the
ICRP estimate and the BEIR-VII estimate highlight the uncertainties inherent in the use
of a dose and dose-rate effectiveness factor.
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2.4.3 Dose Bin Averaging
The new method developed in this work of combining dose-bin averaged risks
using the meta-analytical techniques described above was applied to the bin-averaged
relative risks from each facility. The dose-bin averaged all-cancer mortality relative risks
developed using the new method are plotted in Figure 14.
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Figure 14. Relative risks from Los Alamos National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, the Rocky Flats Plant and the Hanford Site combined using the method
developed in this work. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
The risks are also presented in Table 16. The mean risk predicted for cumulative
exposures below about 1 rem show a prophylactic effect in these populations. However,
the 95% confidence interval contains the zero-equivalency point (RR=1) at all doses.
There is a large jump in the highest energy bin; this is possibly due to dose-rate effects in
individuals receiving higher doses.
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Table 16. Relative risks from Los Alamos National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, the Rocky Flats Plant and the Hanford Site combined using the method
developed in this work. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Dose
(rem)
0.074
0.2
0.45
0.92
1.82
3.63
8.24
197.8

95% Confidence
Interval
Relative
Risk
0.025
0.975
0.306
1.638
0.71
0.514
1.679
0.93
0.585
1.562
0.96
0.562
1.457
0.91
0.803
1.335
1.04
1.03
0.681
1.552
0.571
1.903
1.04
0.893
1.999
1.34

For comparison, relative risks were also calculated using the method of data
pooling; these results are shown in Figure 15. (Tabulated results are presented in Table
17). Comparing these two figures, it is clear that the technique of pooling over-estimates
the risks to workers. Thus, the utility of the new method using meta-analysis techniques
is demonstrated. The control population for the pooled estimate was the pooled
unexposed population drawn from all studies. Data was pooled (and confidence intervals
calculated) using the open source epidemiological tool Openepi [107].
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Figure 15. Relative risks calculated from pooled (Aggregated) data from all four studies.
Table 17. Relative risks from Los Alamos National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, the Rocky Flats Plant and the Hanford Site combined using the obsolescent
method of Data Pooling. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Dose
(rem)
0.074
0.2
0.45
0.92
1.82
3.63
8.24
197.8

95% Confidence
Interval
Relative
Risk
0.025
0.975
0.84
0.917
1.000
1.065
1.246
1.445
1.633
1.651

0.730
0.807
0.884
0.945
1.113
1.299
1.474
1.491

0.960
1.042
1.131
1.201
1.396
1.609
1.809
1.829

The highest-dose bin is also the widest. Thus, a histogram is presented demonstrating the
frequency distribution of doses in this highest bin. As expected the doses are skewed
toward the lower edge of the bin. The lowest bin is cut off at 1,000 for illustration
purposes though it represents 3,587 data points.
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Figure 16. Histogram showing frequency of doses in the highest dose bin for the pooled
data set. Abscissa labels are at bin midpoints. Lowest dose bin contains 3,587 doses that
are cut off for ease of display.

2.5 Chapter Conclusions
This chapter developed a new framework for evaluating the occupational risks
seen by workers, not only in radiation environments, but in any setting where ALARA
practices are mandated. This framework was achieved by first developing a method for
determining the homogeneity of epidemiological study populations and showing that
heterogeneous populations are not suitable for pooled analysis. This work then proposed
a new statistical methodology, based on the techniques of meta-analysis, which provides
an alternative method of combining epidemiological studies that avoids the pitfalls of
pooling.

79

The cohort-combination methods developed in this work were used to develop
all-cancer mortality risk estimates for department of energy workers employed at four
nuclear weapons laboratories: Los Alamos National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, the Rocky Flats Plant, and the Hanford Site. The methods developed in this
work were used to estimate risks to these workers in two ways: the combination of
regression parameters and the combination of dose-bin averaged risks. The linear
regression methodology showed excellent agreement with previously published estimates
derived from studies of the atomic bomb survivors. This parameterization of excess
relative risks, however, forced the assumption of a linear, no-threshold model which, as
was seen in the dose-bin averaged data, was not necessarily appropriate for the data set.
The dose-bin averaged data suggests that below a lifetime dose of 1-rem,
exposure to radiation may provide a prophylactic effect, known as hormesis. This is a
common finding in the literature and is often attributed to the “healthy worker effect.” By
choice of the relative risk as the dose-response metric, however, the healthy worker effect
is expected to be normalized as healthy workers are compared to other healthy workers.
Further, by requiring tests of heterogeneity before cohorts are combined, the healthy
worker effect is further minimized.
It is clear from a comparison of Figure 14 with Figure 15 that the risk estimates
derived from the pooled analysis overestimate those derived from the technique
developed by this work. Thus, previous studies that employed pooled analysis should be
revisited, their populations evaluated for heterogeneity, and possibly recombined to
determine the degree to which the original results were subject to a cohort-heterogeneity
bias.
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Chapter 3. Applicaton of Risk Estimates to ALARA assessment of the Americium
Recovery Project
3.1 Introduction
This research develops a dose assessment for the processes required to fulfill the
production planning basis for the proposed Americium Recovery Project (ARP) to
recover americium-241 from americium-rich plutonium residues. This research also
develops a methodology for assessing whether current staffing plans result in worker
doses that are as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA), given the shielding and
radiation protection scheme here developed. This work evaluates the risk associated with
the radiation protection scheme in terms of the linear no-threshold estimate of risk
developed in the previous section, and compares the risk to Los Alamos’ current
definition of acceptable. In addition to modifying existing MCNP5 glovebox models, this
research also develops several new models for various shielding designs. Further, time
and motion data for these processes are developed to estimate the total dose to workers
engaged in these operations. The goal of this research is a new dose analysis for the
Americium Project based on the best available information plus a determination of the
number of workers required to keep doses below an acceptable level given different doseresponse paradigms. This latter goal serves to implement some of the models and results
from Chapter 2 toward development of a new activity at Los Alamos. The time-motion
study and glovebox model used by this work are both being implemented by the radiation
protection analysts employed by the ARP.
3.2 Background
There is a continuing national need for americium-241 (Am-241, 241Am) to
support fabrication of Americium-Beryllium (AmBe) neutron sources, the largest
customer for which is oil and natural gas well-logging companies [108]. Overall, there is
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a dearth of Am-241 supply and there are many customers who are interested in obtaining
these sources. Am-241 feed sources are varied, but the most common and easily
extractable sources are those in plutonium-based materials. Historically, the Department
of Energy supplied the actinide alpha-emitting material, usually AmO2 that was then
mixed with beryllium to create a neutron source [109]. Given the current lack of supply,
there is renewed interest in supplying Am-241 to commercial interests.
Am-241 extracted by the ARP will primarily be used in well-logging applications.
Well-logging is a critical process in the assessment of the production potential of a well;
in fact, most financial institutions only accept data derived from AmBe sources. The
DOE supports the oil and gas industry in many ways to help ensure the overall security of
the petroleum supply. The Rocky Flats Plant and Hanford produced Am-241 in the 1960s
and 1970s which was primarily extracted from weapons-grade plutonium. In the early
1980s, Los Alamos and the Savannah River Site produced 14 kg AmO2, which resulted in
a glut in the americium market leading to the cessation of the DOE americium program.
This supply has been depleted and currently companies are purchasing americium
sources from Russia. To mitigate americium market volatility and supplier risk, the DOE
in concert with industrial partners has identified a need for a sustainable domestic
production supply [109]. The Los Alamos Plutonium Facility, PF-4, has been chosen to
extract the Am-241 from plutonium. Most of the americium would be obtained from
spent salt residues that were or are produced during molten-salt extraction (MSE) or insitu chlorination operations, both of which are used to extract americium from plutonium
to provide plutonium feed to other programs like Pit Manufacturing. The MSE salts,
which still contain significant quantities of plutonium, are processed through chloride-
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based aqueous chemical recovery to recover the plutonium. An additional process added
to chloride recovery would allow the americium in these salts to be purified as an oxide.
The anticipated batch size would be an output of 30 g AmO2 per batch.
The primary radiological concern with weapons-grade plutonium or concentrated
sources of Am-241 is photon exposure. Am-241 is a decay product from Pu-241, which is
produced by successive neutron capture in lower atomic mass number plutonium nuclides
as they are irradiated in reactors. In higher grades of plutonium, e.g., weapons-grade
plutonium, the Pu-241 is a normal, yet minor, isotopic component of the plutonium. Pu241, with a half-life of 14.4 years, beta decays to Am-241, which has a longer half-life of
432.7 years. Thus, the Am-241 net ingrowth is relatively rapid because it builds up faster
than it decays. The pertinent decay chain is shown in Equation (2.1).
241
94

Pu →

0
−1

4
237
β + 241
95 Am → 2 α + 93 Np

(2.1)

The key exposure concern with this decay chain is that, as the excited Np-237 nucleus
transitions to its ground state, it produces a relatively intense (high yield) 59.5 keV
gamma ray. This low-energy gamma ray is relatively easy to shield with appropriate
technology such as glove boxes with lead- or composite-lined gloves and leaded glass
viewing windows.
A Staffing Problem
Given the radiological concerns with processing MSE residues and, more
specifically, Am-241, an exposure assessment must be performed to assess the dose to
the workers who will be performing the process steps. Because the process has been fully
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designed, it is possible to perform this assessment in accordance with the planning basis
of 25 batches of AmO2 per year [109].
The federally- (and locally-) mandated radiation-protection design objective for
new processes at Los Alamos is that the dose rates (including background doses from
other processes in the room) not exceed an average of 0.5 mrem/h (resulting in 1
rem/year for a 2,000-hour work year). This poses a significant problem because the area
in which the americium gloveboxes are to be located has a background dose rate of, on
average, greater than 1 mrem/h.
Further, there is not sufficient time in a year for one worker to complete 25
production cycles. If each cycle takes about 94 hours, one worker would require about
2,346 hours (about 59 40-hour weeks) to complete 25 cycles. A study of worker
efficiency at Los Alamos national Laboratory suggests that workers are 42% efficient
[110] (after accounting for holidays, vacation, dressing out, 18 etc.) a single worker has
840 productive hours per 2,000 hour year ( 2, 000 ⋅ 0.42 =
840 ). Thus, the minimum
number of employees that are required strictly to fulfill the planning basis is:

hours
year
= 2.79 employees
hours
840
employee − year
2345.5

(2.2)

Thus it is necessary to have multiple workers engaged in americium activities
based on processing requirements alone. After calculating the dose to a single (notional)
individual performing 25 operations per year, this dose can then be divided among
18

The term “dressing out” refers to applying the appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) required
to enter a radiation controlled area.
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multiple workers to satisfy federal and local dose-limit regulations and requirements. The
DOE mandates in 10 CFR 835 that doses be kept “As Low As Reasonably Achievable”
(ALARA) [111]. From the perspective of Los Alamos, ALARA translates to capital
expenditures of $2000 per person-rem avoided and up to $10,000 per person-rem avoided
for employees exceeding 1 rem [19].
The question this analysis addresses is how to determine the optimal number of
employees to use considering the change in risk that each will incur as the work is spread
among an increasing number of employees. First, the ALARA-reasonable staffing
requirements will be calculated by comparing the change in cost per employee added
with the monetary savings that spreading the dose among n employees would affect
because of decreased need for ALARA expenditures. 19
An alternative method of developing a risk-based estimate of the optimal number
of workers is to compare the change in risk each worker experiences as the dose is spread
among a larger population to the marginal cost of hiring additional workers. This method
determines what the fair value of the worker’s risk is by equating it with their agreedupon compensation. Compensation does not simply refer to the amount that the worker is
paid, but the burdened cost to the program employing the worker. Acceptance of
employment by the program is tantamount to the worker’s belief that the institution is
being fairly charged for the risk the worker is incurring. As the individual’s risk is
decreased, so is their cost, presumably. The value at which the cost equals the risk is the
optimal value.

19

2,000 per person-rem avoided and $10,000 per person-rem avoided for individuals nearing their
administrative limit.
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A third method compares the change in risk to the workers as more workers are
added to the “reasonable” ALARA expenditures to estimate the number of employees
necessary to maintain the risk to any individual below an acceptable level.
3.3 Methods
This section details the methods, both conceptual and computational, to determine
an estimate for the minimum number of workers necessary to maintain americium project
workers’ risks below acceptable levels.
3.3.1 Radiation Transport Calculations
Particle transport theory is the study and development of solutions to variants of
the Boltzmann transport equation for kinetic gases. While there are several common
numerical methods used to directly solve the equation, one of the most popular
techniques of transport theory, the Monte Carlo method, indirectly approximates a
solution. The Monte Carlo method is a stochastic numerical technique that exploits the
fact that macroscopic cross sections may be interpreted as a probability of interaction per
unit distance traveled by a particle. A set of particle histories is generated by following
individual particles through successive collisions. These collisions and their results are
determined from the range of possibilities by sets of random numbers. Perhaps the most
well-known code based on this method is the Monte Carlo N-Particle transport code
(MCNP version 5, or MCNP5). All transport calculations performed for this analysis,
namely those to estimate the neutron and gamma-ray doses, will use MCNP5.
Photon and Neutron Source Terms
The photon and neutron source terms used in this analysis were calculated using
ORIGEN-ARP. The photon source term (in photons per second per gram) for 1 gram of
pure americium-241 is shown in Figure 17.
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Figure 17. Photon spectrum for Americium-241 source material.
The neutron source term is due to alpha-n reactions in the americium oxalate and oxide
forms. Plots of these neutron spectra are shown in Figure 18.
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Figure 18. Neutron spectrum for americium-241 oxide and oxalate.
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Glovebox Models
The first step of this analysis was the development of computational models of the
planned gloveboxes and the sources contained therein. The configurations and shielding
technologies present in various gloveboxes vary from application to application. Four
gloveboxes were selected for analysis. The first glovebox (glovebox 1) would house the
primary plutonium processing unit operation that extracts the majority of the americium
from the feed stock. The second glovebox (glovebox 2) would house two processes:
secondary plutonium processing and americium oxalate precipitation. The processes in
this glovebox will remove the remaining plutonium from the feed stock and precipitate
americium oxalate from the aqueous solution. The third glovebox will perform waste
processing and uses small enough amounts of source material so as not to be of concern.
Glovebox 4 houses the oxalate calcination and oxide handling operations. In this box, the
oxalate is baked in a calcination furnace for 8 hours, thus converting it to AmO2, which is
the final product.
Glovebox 1 Model
Detailed models of Glovebox 1 were developed at Los Alamos by A. Crawford
[112]. Crawford developed 13 glovebox models each containing different radiation
protection measures. As a starting point, the most detailed of these models was taken to
represent Glovebox 1. The sides of the glovebox consist of a 0.25-inch lead slab
sandwiched between a 3/16th inch slab of 304 stainless steel on the inside and a 1/8th inch
slab of 304 stainless steel on the outside. Inside the glovebox is a slab tank that had to be
modified to decrease weight so that this 0.25-inch lead slab was replaced with a 0.125-
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inch slab of tin. The top and bottom of the box were assumed to be 3/16th inch layers of
304 stainless steel. The inside of the box was layered with 0.09 mil (0.23 cm) of Kynar. 20
The viewing windows are made of 0.625-inch leaded glass. For applications
involving strong neutron sources, boron-doped glass (borosilicate glass) is preferred over
leaded glass due to boron’s high neutron-absorption properties; leaded glass is preferred
for strong photon sources. Am-241 is a strong photon emitter, and thus leaded glass is
preferred. The photon-emission characteristics of the Am-241 source also dictate that
leaded gloves be used. For this application 30-mil (0.08 cm) hypalon-lead-neoprene
gloves are used. While there is discussion of replacing the lead in these gloves with a
composite material, leaded gloves are currently available and in use. In the leaded gloves,
two three-section hand-and-arm phantoms were used to determine the extremity dose.
Whole body dose was measured by placing 30 cm × 30 cm × 1 cm right perpendicular
parallelepiped tally cells at 1 inch and 1 foot from the face of the box. A 3D image of the
glovebox described in the model is shown in Figure 19.

20

Kynar, or polyvinylidene fluoride, PVDF, is required in applications where gloveboxes constructed of
stainless steel must handle hydrochloric acid (HCl) as the HCl will attack the stainless steel. Kynar is
resistant to chloride attack and thus is used to line the glovebox.
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Gloveports
Viewing Windows

Figure 19. MCNP Visual Editor model of a glovebox used for Am-241 recovery.

The specifications quoted above are presented in Table 18. The source term used in this
model was a self-shielded mix of 34-g of americium-241 with 500 g of Pu-239 in
hydrochloric acid in an 18.1 L slab tank and an 1.9 L filter boat. Depending on the
exposure case, as will be discussed later, the source was either completely in the slab
tank, or split between the slab tank and the filter boat. As discussed previously, the slab
tank is shielded with 304 stainless steel and an additional 0.125-inch tin shield on the slab
tank.
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Table 18. Specifications for americium recovery Glovebox 1 modeled in MCNP5 [112].
Glovebox area
Sides

Material

Thickness (cm)

Inner Type 304 SS layer 0.47625 cm
Lead layer
0.635 cm
Outer Type 304 SS layer 0.3175 cm
Top
Type 304 SS Layer

0.47625 cm

Type 304 SS Layer

0.47625 cm

Kynar lining

0.23 cm

Leaded glass

0.79375 cm

Bottom
Inside GB
Viewing Windows
Leaded Gloves
Hypalon-Lead-Neoprene 0.08 cm
Glovebox 2 Model
Glovebox 2 [113] , in addition to housing secondary plutonium processing,
houses the americium oxalate (241Am)2(C2O4)3·10H2O precipitation unit operation.
Three-dimensional images of the MCNP model for the glovebox are shown in Figure 20
and Figure 21. Many of the shielding specifications for Glovebox 2 are similar to
Glovebox 1 with a few exceptions. The outer surface of the glovebox uses 316 stainless
steel as opposed to the 304 stainless found in Glovebox 1. A layer of Kynar was not
present in the MCNP model though Glovebox 2 will contain Kynar. For the whole-body
calculations, 30-mil gloves were modeled (a conservative assumption) but, for the
extremity calculation, credit was taken for the 65-mil gloves that will be present in
reality. Glovebox 2 houses a cylindrical tank shielded by a 0.125-inch-thick layer of lead
(as opposed to the shielded slab tank in Glovebox 1) that is used for oxalate precipitation
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and two extraction chromatography columns used for the secondary plutonium
separation. A summary of Glovebox 2 geometric specifications is provided in Table 19.

Figure 20. Three-dimensional model of americium recovery Glovebox 2.

Extraction Chromatography
Columns

Oxalate Precipitation Tank

Tallies

Figure 21. Solid/Wireframe model of Glovebox 2.
Precipitate filtration is performed in a ceramic filter boat. Figure 22 presents a side-byside comparison of the actual filter boat from Glovebox 2 with its MCNP5 model.
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Figure 22. Porcelain filter boat (left), MCNP5 solid model of porcelain filter boat
(center), and MCNP solid/wireframe model of porcelain filter boat to illustrate the source
location (right).
Table 19. Specifications for americium recovery Glovebox 2 modeled in MCNP5.
Glovebox area
Sides

Material

Thickness (cm)

Inner Type 316 SS layer 0.47625 cm
Lead layer
0.635 cm
Outer Type 316 SS layer 0.3175 cm
Top
Type 316 SS Layer

0.47625 cm

Type 316 SS Layer

0.47625 cm

Kynar lining

None

Leaded glass

0.79375 cm

Bottom
Inside GB
Viewing Windows
Leaded Gloves
Hypalon-Lead-Neoprene
(whole body/extremity) 0.0762 cm/0.1651 cm
Cylinder Tank Shielding
Lead

0.3175 cm
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Glovebox 4 Model
Glovebox 4 [114], the calcination glovebox, houses a calcination furnace and a
novel piece of equipment – the “pig-that-is-a-jig,” or “pig/jig” for short (formally, the
holding jig). The pig/jig is intended to allow workers to twist on the cap for the innermost
shipping container (the container making contact with the oxide) without having to hold
onto the base (where the dose rates reach around 1 rem/h. A three-dimensional model of
the calcination glovebox is shown in Figure 23.

Calcination Furnace

Inner container

Figure 23. Model image of Glovebox 4 (calcination glovebox). Through the transparent
side panel the crucible is visible along with the inner shipping container in the pig/jig.
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Glovebox 4 is fabricated entirely out of 316 stainless steel with a wall thickness of 0.476
cm. The glovebox wall includes 0.635 cm lead shield (lead sandwiched between 0.158
cm layers of 316 stainless steel) up to the bend-line above the top of the large viewing
windows. Geometric details for the MCNP5 are provided in Table 20.The engineering
drawing of the inner container is shown in Figure 24:

Figure 24. Engineering drawing of innermost shipping container (far left) for americium
oxide [115] shown along with its solid (center) and wireframe (far right) MCNP5 models.
An engineering drawing of the pig/jig along with its associated MCNP model is shown in
Figure 25.
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Figure 25. Engineering drawing of the pig/jig (far left) [116] followed by MCNP5 models
in various stages of wireframe transparency to show details.

An engineering drawing of the Middle container is shown in Figure 26

Figure 26. Engineering drawing of middle shipping container (far left) shown along with
solid MCNP5 model of middle shipping container (center) and wireframe/solid model of
the nested configuration of middle and inner containers (far right). During shipping, the
inner container will be nested inside the middle container [117].
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Table 20. Specifications for americium recovery Glovebox 4 modeled in MCNP5.

Glovebox area

Material

Thickness (cm)

Inner Type 316 SS layer

0.47625 cm

Inner Type 316 SS layer

0.3175 cm

Lead layer

0.158 cm

Outer Type 316 SS layer

0.3175 cm

Kynar lining

None

Leaded glass

0.79375 cm

Hypalon-Lead-Neoprene
(whole body/extremity)

0.0762 cm/0.1651 cm

Barnstead Calcination Furnace

N/A

Shell
Shielding

Inside GB
Viewing Windows
Leaded Gloves

Special Equipment
Holding Jig

3.3.2 Response Functions
The HP(10,0*) response functions [118], which translate particle fluence to
personal dose equivalent, were used because these are the response functions mandated
by the Los Alamos National Laboratory radiation protection procedure.
To calculate whole-body dose, cell detectors were placed at 1 inch from the
glovebox (and at 1 foot, in the case of Glovebox 1) dictated by the time-motion
information using F4 tallies convoluted with the HP(10,0*) [118] response function for
ambient dose equivalent at a 10 mm depth in the ICRP slab-geometric phantom. This
response function is shown in Figure 27.
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Figure 27. HP(10,0*) personal dose equivalent response function for photons from ICRP
74.
Extremity dose was calculated by averaging over right-circular cylindrical cells at
the surface and 10 inches from the source inside the glovebox. F4 cell tallies were used to
calculate the flux, which was convoluted with HP(10,0*) response function.
For neutrons, the response function HP(10) was also used. HP(10) are the neutron
fluence-to-effective dose-equivalent conversion factors for personal dose equivalent in an
ICRP slab. All response functions were taken from ICRP 74. This response function is
shown in Figure 28.
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Figure 28. Hp(10) personal dose equivalent response function for neutrons.

While Monte Carlo transport methods are valuable tools for creating detailed
exposure models, they are computationally expensive. If an analyst or engineer wishes to
model an entire glovebox facility, a tool like MCNP quickly becomes unmanageable. The
dose incurred by the worker from their immediate task (called the primary dose) is only a
portion of his total dose; other radiation sources in the same room must also be taken into
account. [19] 21 Estimating this secondary dose is typically done by measuring
background dose rates in the room.
3.3.3 Time-Motion Study
Motivation for Time-Motion Study
An important piece in the development of an occupational radiological assessment is the
development of a time-motion study. Time-motion studies are based on experts’
estimations of the amount of time required to perform the unit operations comprising a
21

This is called secondary background dose. Primary background dose refers to sources external to the
room such as cosmic radiation and radionuclides in building materials.
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larger process (henceforth “time data”) as well as the physical location of the operator’s
trunk and extremities (“motion data”). These data can be used to estimate production
rates or can be combined with dose calculations to estimate the total dose incurred by
performing an entire cycle of operations. Time-motion data is also instrumental in initial
phases of the analysis as the information provided by the subject matter experts often aids
the analyst in the development of exposure cases.

Development of the Time-Motion Study
Time-motion studies came to favor in the first half of the 20th century as a
business practice intended to increase worker efficiency [119]. In the context of radiation
protection design, the results of a time-motion study are used during the exposure casedevelopment phase of the analysis to determine the exposure geometry that must be
modeled.
In many cases, time-motion studies are performed for operations that have been in
practice for some time. In a situation such as is found in the development of a new
process such as the Americium Recovery Project, the study-development process
typically consists of successive interviews and observation sessions with multiple subject
matter experts (SMEs) involved with each step of a given process. In these cases, the
analyst typically observes the process under consideration, uses a stopwatch to measure
time the operator or SME spends at various distances from the source, which are typically
measured in a non-radiation environment. This is an iterative process where the analyst
and subject matter expert continue to modify the data until a consensus is reached. An
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example flow sheet for the development of a typical time-motion study is shown in
Figure 29.

Figure 29. Example flow sheet for the development of a time-motion study for operations
currently in practice.
With proposed operations such as those to be performed in the americium
recovery operations, typically there are few individuals with the experience to estimate
the time and motion data. Because these processes are still at various phases of
development, time-motion studies serve an important role in the engineering of the total
system. For these cases, it is important that close contact be maintained between the
radiological engineers and the SME(s). An example flow sheet for this case is shown in
Figure 30.
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Figure 30. Example flow sheet for the development of a time-motion study for proposed
operations.
In the current project, several unit operations intended for the americium recovery
operations are currently operational, though in other contexts. Thus, estimates of time and
motion data for these processes are subject to less uncertainty in estimation than if these
operations were purely notional.
Inputs for Time-Motion Study
The time and motion data describe time spent at various distances from either the source
(for extremity dose) or the glovebox face (for whole-body exposure). The extremity data
present times spent at two and ten inches from the source performing different manual
tasks. Two inches from the source is taken to be the surface of any applicable container.
In the case of Glovebox 1, when the source was split between the slab tank and the filter
boat, the distances were taken as 2 and 10 inches from the slab-tank face at the height of
the glove ports. The whole-body data present times spent at one and two feet from the
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glovebox face. Times estimated at one inch from the glovebox face represent the time the
worker spends with hands in the glovebox while times estimated at two feet from the
glovebox typically represent times spent observing the glovebox with hands out of
gloves. For some unit operations, a large majority of the operator’s time is spent away
from the glovebox. These times are also estimated as part of the time-motion study and
the dose rates during these times (both whole body and extremity) are estimated using the
typical background dose rate in the room. The conservative assumption was made that
dose rates at two feet from the glovebox face were the same as those at the surface. For
Glovebox 1, in the case where the source was split between the tank and the filter boat,
the one-inch dose rate was taken as the dose rate at the glove port nearest to the filter boat
and the two feet dose rate was taken as the dose rate between the glove ports.

Results of Time-Motion Study
Introduction and Dissolution
The first activity performed is the transfer of the feed material from the PF-4 vault to the
area where the processes will occur. The material is removed from the vault by cart, and
is moved to the room. The material is then placed on the trolley by way of the
introduction hood. The material is transferred from the intro hood to the work
environment using the trolley system. Because these processes are currently in practice
and are beyond the scope of the amercium-recovery operations, they are not analyzed
from a time-motion perspective. With the exception of the analysis of Glovebox 1, the
conservative assumption is made that, in calculating whole-body dose, all time is spent at
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the closest distance defined in the time-motion study. The various distances are, however,
used for the extremity calculations for all gloveboxes.
Primary Plutonium Separation
Primary plutonium separation takes place in Glovebox 1 and consists of feed treatment to
put the plutonium into the +4 valence state followed by two anion exchange processes to
remove plutonium from the solution and purify the americium. The time and motion data
for primary plutonium processing is shown in Table 21.
Table 21. Time and motion data for primary plutonium processing. Times listed are in
hours.
Extremity
Whole Body
2
10
Out of
1
1
Room
Unit Operation
inch
inches
gloves
inch
foot
background
Filtration
0.05
0.5
2
0.55
0.5
2.55
Column Prep
0.05
0.5
2
0.55
0.5
2.55
Column Load
0.1
1
6
1.1
1
7.1
Column Wash
0.05
0.5
4
0.55
0.5
4.55
Column Elution
0.05
0.5
4
0.55
0.5
4.55
Pu Soln. Transfer 0.05
0.1
2
0.15
0.1
2.15
Am Soln.
0.05
0.1
2
0.15
0.1
2.15
Transfer
Secondary Plutonium Separation and Americium Extraction Chromatography
Further purification of actinides from the process effluent solution is performed in
Glovebox 2 by plutonium anion exchange followed by extraction chromatography that
removes and purifies the vast majority of americium (>99%). The time and motion data
for these processes are shown in Table 22.
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Table 22. Time and motion data for secondary plutonium processing and americium
extraction chromatography.
Extremity
Whole Body
2
10
Out of
1
1
Room
Unit Operation
inch
inches
gloves
inch
foot
background
Column Prep
0.1
0.1
2
0.2
0.1
2.2
Column Load
0.2
0.4
6
0.6
0.4
6.6
Column Wash
0.1
0.1
4
0.2
0.1
4.2
Pu Column Elution 0.1
0.1
4
0.2
0.1
4.2
Am Column
included with above operation
Elution
Pu Soln. Transfer
0.1
0.1
2
0.2
0.1
2.2
Americium Oxalate Precipitation
After extraction chromatography, the purified americium eluate solution is combined
with oxalic acid dihydrate. This precipitates the americium from the eluate as americium
oxalate. This process takes place in the same glovebox as secondary anion exchange and
extraction chromatography (Glovebox 2). The time and motion data for the americium
oxalate precipitation unit operation is shown in Table 23.
Table 23. Time and motion data for americium oxalate precipitation. Times shown are in
hours.
Extremity
Unit Operation
Chemistry Adjust
Filter Boat Prep
Reagent Addition
Digestion
Filtration
Washing
Air Dry
Am oxalate
handling
Am oxalate
transfer

Whole Body

Out of
gloves
0.05
0.1
2
included with above operation
0.05
0.1
1
0.05
0.1
1
0.05
0.1
1
included with above operation
0.01
0.1
3

2 inch

10 inches

1 inch

1 foot

0.15

0.1

Room
background
2.15

0.15
0.15
0.15

0.1
0.1
0.1

1.15
1.15
1.15

0.11

0.1

3.11

0.01

0.1

0

0.11

0.1

0.11

0.1

1

2

1.1

1

3.1
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Americium Calcination and Oxide Handling
The americium oxalate cake precipitated from the precipitation unit operation is
transferred to a separate glovebox containing a calcination furnace where it is converted
to americium oxide. After calcination, the oxide is weighed, blended, and sampled. The
time and motion data for calcination and oxide handling is shown in Table 24.

Table 24. Time and motion data for calcination and oxide handling processes. Times
shown are in hours.

Unit Operation
Oxalate Calcination
Loading Furnace
Furnace Cycle
Unloading Furnace
Am2O3 handling
Weighing in crucible
Weighing in
innermost C.
Blending
Combine/Split
Sampling

2
inch

Extremity
10
Out of
inches
gloves

Whole Body
1
1
inch foot

Room
background

0.01
0
0.05

0.1
0.05
0.1

0
2
1

0.11
0.05
0.15

0.1
0.05
0.1

0.11
2.05
1.15

0.01

0.1

1

0.11

0.1

1.11

0.05

0.1

1

0.15

0.1

1.15

0.01
0.05
0.01

0.1
0.2
0.1

2
2
1

0.11
0.25
0.11

0.1
0.2
0.1

2.11
2.25
1.11

The final steps that were considered are the bagging of the batch (removal from the
glovebox) and the carting of it back to the vault. The time and motion data for these steps
is shown in Table 25. The whole-body dose for the case when the source is outside of the
glovebox was taken as the personal dose equivalent at 13.5” from the inner-container
surface.
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Table 25. Time and motion data for removing the batch from the glovebox line. Times
shown are in hours.
Extremity
Whole Body
Unit Operation 2 inch 10 inches Out of gloves 1 inch 1 foot Room background
Trolley
0.1
0.2
2
0.3
1
3
Bagout
0.05
0.1
1
0.3
3
Cart
0.5
1
Vault
1
1
The planning basis for the ARP suggests that 25 batches will be produced per year. This
would multiply these time values by a factor of 25. The times for a single operation are
compared to those for 25 operations in Table 26.
Table 26. Total times for 1 and 25 complete americium operations. Background is the
times spent with hands not in gloves. Background includes time spent in glovebox 3 the
processes in which were not modeled.
Extremity
Whole Body
In Gloves Out of gloves Distance 1 Distance 2 Background
Total time (hrs)
(1 operation)
Total time (hrs)
(25 operations)

9.42

67.5

9.27

14.65

93.82

235.5

1678.5

231.75

366.25

2,346

3.3.4 Marginal Risk-Benefit Analysis
Based on the results of the time-motion study and assuming a 2,000-h work year
(40 h/wk and 50 wk/year), one person cannot complete the 25 yearly operations
mandated by the planning basis for the ARP. Further, a study of workplace efficiency at
TA-55 has demonstrated that employees are only engaged in productive work 42% of
their time [110] . Additionally, the secondary background in the room where the ARP
activities will take place maintains an average background of 1 mrem/hour (with locally
higher areas) which is twice the 0.5 mrem/year design goal. Thus, multiple operators
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must be employed to satisfy the production requirements, both from a time and
radiological perspective.
To estimate an optimal number of workers, this work develops a framework for
applying marginal risk-benefit analysis to a hazardous-environment staffing problem.
Typically, discussions of risk-benefit analysis center on a “willingness to pay,” which
describes an individual’s desire to trade some amount of risk to derive some benefit [12].
A common example is automobile driving; drivers accept the risks inherent with
automobile operation in exchange for increased mobility. Workers in hazardous industrial
environments also implicitly set a value for their willingness to accept risk by accepting a
job offer at a given rate of compensation. Compensation does not refer to the worker’s
take-home pay; it refers to the amount the organization pays to hire them. This amount is
referred to as the burdened cost of an employee and includes among other things facilities
(including safety and security infrastructure), and administration. By accepting an offer
of employment, the worker is agreeing that the amount the organization pays to keep
them employed is commensurate with their level of risk.
Thus, to determine the optimal number of workers for the ARP, the change in risk
(marginal risk) per individual will be compared with the change in compensation
(marginal benefit) per individual as the americium-production work is spread among a
growing number of employees. In both cases, these are negative as the risk and the
compensation are decreasing.
An additional consideration is that the Department of Energy mandates that
exposures to radiation be kept ALARA. Thus, the change in compensation, as well as the

109

change in risk will be compared with the Los Alamos definition of an ALARAreasonable expenditure. Los Alamos has defined reasonable ALARA expenditures as
$2,000 per person/rem avoided and $10,000 per person rem avoided for people
approaching their 2-rem limit [19]. From the perspective of the Los Alamos Radiation
protection policy, “approaching their two-rem limit” will imply that the employee has
exceeded the Laboratory’s action level 22 for whole body radiation of 1 rem in a year
whole body. There is, however, a tendency to reduce this action level locally (at the
group and division level) [120]. Thus, analysis will be performed for the action levels of
500 mrem, 800 mrem, and 1 rem, all of which either have been or are currently
implemented as proposed dose limits or action levels.
Monetization of Risk and Calculation of Monetary “Risk Value”
Value of Statistical Life
To estimate the number of operators required to reduce the individual doses below
acceptable levels, defined as the Laboratory’s ALARA-reasonable expenditures,
monetary estimates of the risk incurred by the employees can be used. There are several
ways this can be done: by assuming that individuals are similar to a type of capital
equipment whose potential output is lost on its premature demise, by recent damages
awarded by courts to the surviving family members of a person killed in an industrial
accident, or by assessing the probability of death from engaging in a certain activity and
estimating the insurance premium used to cover the risk [21]. An additional approach that
has been applied is to determine an estimated value of the cost per unit dose, using
methods of estimating the value of statistical life [121]. This research will use a similar
22

Action levels are dose thresholds that require notifying the worker, the responsible line manager (RLM), and
radiation protection management. Radiation protection personnel issue these notifications electronically after dosimetry
data become available. After making appropriate modifications to the activities and/or work area, the RLM must track
additional dose against applicable limits [19].
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method by monetizing the relative risks developed in this work using the EPA’s
estimated value of statistical life: $8.6 million (in 2014 dollars) [122], [123]. The EPA’s
value of statistical life is based on estimates of how much individuals are willing to pay
for small reductions in their risks of dying from adverse health conditions that may be
caused by environmental pollution; in the present case, this is taken to be occupational
exposure to ionizing radiation.
The conceptual derivation of the value of statistical life is described by the
National Center for Environmental Economics as [122]:
In the scientific literature, these estimates of willingness to pay for small reductions in
mortality risks are often referred to as the "value of a statistical life.” This is because these
values are typically reported in units that match the aggregate dollar amount that a large
group of people would be willing to pay for a reduction in their individual risks of dying in a
year, such that we would expect one fewer death among the group during that year on
average. This is best explained by way of an example. Suppose each person in a sample of
100,000 people were asked how much he or she would be willing to pay for a reduction in
their individual risk of dying of 1 in 100,000, or 0.001%, over the next year. Since this
reduction in risk would mean that we would expect one fewer death among the sample of
100,000 people over the next year on average, this is sometimes described as "one statistical
life saved.” Now suppose that the average response to this hypothetical question was $100.
Then the total dollar amount that the group would be willing to pay to save one statistical life
in a year would be $100 per person × 100,000 people, or $10 million. This is what is meant by
the "value of a statistical life.” Importantly, this is not an estimate of how much money any
single individual or group would be willing to pay to prevent the certain death of any particular
person.

The term “value of statistical life” is slowly being replaced with “value of mortality risk
reduction” [124].
Dose spreading
As the number of workers employed by the ARP increases, the dose can be
assumed to decrease by a factor of 1/n, where n is the number of workers. Thus, with the
LNT assumption, the risk to each individual is calculated as:

Risk = β
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D
n

(2.3)

where β is the excess relative risk per unit dose for all deaths, D is the total dose per year
for 1 person performing 25 americium operations, and n is the number of workers
incurring dose. The monetary value of this risk, called the “risk value,” is found by
multiplying the risk by the EPA’s estimated statistical value of life (denoted as σ):
Risk Value LNT = σ β

D
n

(2.4)

Taking the first derivative of equation (2.4) with respect to the number of employees
yields the change in risk value that occurs when the workforce size changes by one
operator, referred to as the “marginal risk value.” This quantity is given by

∂ 1
 1 
M arg inal Risk Value
σ βD =
=
LNT
  σ βD− 2  .
∂n  n 
 n 

(2.5)

To find the minimum number of employees required to maintain individual doses
(and hence risks) ALARA, the marginal risk value will be compared with the marginal
ALARA expenditures. The marginal ALARA value represents the change in ALARAreasonable expenditures affected by changes in the number of employees.
For individual doses above the m-rem (say m = 1 rem for concreteness) watch
level, the ALARA values are determined as follows. First, the dose above one rem to
each employee (found by subtracting 1 rem from the dose to each employee) is multiplied
by the number of exposed employees and by $10,000, which is the amount deemed
reasonable to spend to reduce each individual’s dose to 1 rem. This value is summed with
the $2,000 per person-rem avoided figure. This is also multiplied by the number of
exposed employees. For individual doses less than 1 rem, the ALARA value is simply the
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product of the number of employees, the dose to each employee, and the $2,000
ALARA-reasonable value. This is shown as a piecewise function in Equation (2.6).



D
D

>m
 $10000  − m  + $2000 ⋅ m  n

n
n



(2.6)
ALARAValue = 
D
D

$2000  
n
<m

n
n
In Equation (2.6), m represents the action-level dose (measured in rem) beyond which the
“reasonable” expenditure value increases to the higher level. D represents the total dose
one employee would incur if he performed all 25 operations. The dose D is divided by n,
the number of employees, to give the dose to each individual employee. The first
derivative of Equation (2.6) is the marginal ALARA value. The recommended minimum
number of employees is then determined by finding the value of n that causes the
marginal risk value to intersect with the marginal ALARA value.
Along with the marginal risk values and the marginal ALARA values, the
marginal benefit (the change in burdened cost per employee as the staffing level is
increased) per worker is calculated and presented. This is done under the assumption that
the burdened (programmatic) cost of each worker is $132 per hour [125]. Thus, the total
staffing cost of completing 25 batches of americium per year will be
132 dollars / hr ⋅ 2346 hr =
$309, 762 per year. This will be spread across the n workers

employed and the rate of change as workers are added will be compared with the change
in risk and the change in ALARA value.
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3.4 Results
This analysis finds that appropriate radiation protection measures are in place to
maintain occupational doses to workers in the americium recovery operations below
current design goals. This analysis is considered to be conservative, so fluctuations in
yearly production are unlikely to be of concern from a radiological perspective.
Several assumptions were made when calculating the doses and comparing them
to the time-motion data. For the Glovebox 2 and Glovebox 4 operations, the whole-body
doses at both distances from the glove ports were taken to be the dose at one inch from
the viewport between the glove ports with the cover off. For Glovebox 1, the dose rates
were calculated at one inch and two feet from the maximally affected port. For Glovebox
2, dose rates were calculated the viewport between the glove ports with the viewport
cover off. For Glovebox 4, doses were taken at one inch from the leaded view port in
front of the source. Secondary background dose was assumed to be equal to 1 mrem/h
based on measurements taken by the radiation protection organization at Los Alamos.
The time-motion study indicates that 81.8 hours will be spent per operation in the room
with the americium process. If 25 batches are to be processed, it will require 2,346 hours
per year and incur a background dose of 1,023 mrem/year whole body. For secondary
background dose to the extremities, the time out of gloves was taken as the exposure
time. Glovebox 3, while being of negligible radiological concern from a process
standpoint, is located in an area with locally higher secondary background radiation23.
Thus, the secondary background dose to the whole-body is the highest radiological
concern.
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3.4.1 Whole-body Results
Table 27 shows the contact times and calculated whole-body doses for each process in
the americium recovery operations.
Table 27. Total times and whole-body doses for americium operations segregated by
glovebox. "Yearly" values assume 25 operations per year. Time includes all time spent in
the room including contact time.
Glovebox

Glovebox 1

Glovebox 2

Glovebox 4

Glovebox 3

Operation
Primary Pu
Processing
Glovebox 1
Total
Secondary Pu
Processing
Am Oxalate
Precipitation
Glovebox 2
Total
Am Oxalate
Calcination
Am Oxide
Handling
Material Out
Glovebox 4
Total
Sum of all
Gloveboxes
Secondary
Background
Total Secondary
Background
Sum with
background

Yearly time (h)

Dose per
batch
(mrem)

Yearly dose
(mrem)

678.75

17.632

440.8

678.75

17.632

440.8

20.60

515.00

1.935

48.38

11.92

298.00

9.764

244.09

32.52

813

11.699

292.47

3.42

85.50

1.575

39.38

7.73

193.25

3.484

87.104

11.00

275.00

4.788

119.7

22.15

553.75

9.847

246.184

81.82

2045.5

39.18

979.5

12 23

300

26.8

670

93.82

2,346

93.82

2,346

-

-

133.0

3,325.5

Time per
batch (h)
27.15
27.15

The photon and neutron contributions to whole body dose are shown in Table 28.

Table 28. Photon and Neutron contribution to whole-body dose from each unit operation
in the americium recovery project.
23

4 hours is spent in a 4.7 mrem/h dose field (3.5 gamma, 1.2 neutron), and 8 hours is spent in a 1 mrem/h
dose field (0.5 mrem/h gamma and 0.5 mrem /h neutron)
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Glovebox

Operation

Glovebox 1

Glovebox 2

Glovebox 4

Photon Contribution
Yearly dose
Dose per batch
(mrem)
(mrem)

Neutron Contribution
Yearly dose
Dose per batch
(mrem)
(mrem)

Primary Pu
Processing
Glovebox 1
Total
Secondary Pu
Processing
Am Oxalate
Precipitation
Glovebox 2
Total
Am Oxalate
Calcination
Am Oxide
Handling

15.1

376.6

2.6

64.2

15.1

376.6

2.6

64.2

0.9

21.8

1.1

26.6

7.0

174.2

2.8

69.9

7.8

196

3.86

96.4

0.3

7.7

1.3

31.7

0.6

15.3

2.9

71.8

Material Out

3.7

91.6

1.1

28.1

Glovebox 4
Total
Sum of all
Gloveboxes

4.6

115

5.26

132

27.49

687.19

11.69

292.26

It is clear that the background dose is the largest concern with respect to whole
body. The glovebox doses represent the conservative case of doses at the central viewport
without a viewport cover. This assumption is conservative because, during normal
operations, the viewport will have a cover installed. Time and dose per operation in the
table refer to the time spent and the dose incurred in processing one batch. The “yearly”
values are the times and doses under the assumption of 25 batches per year.
To illustrate the relative demand of each operation in terms of contact time and
dose, Figure 31 shows pie charts of the worker time per operation and whole-body dose
per operation respectively. Note that though americium oxalate calcination and
americium oxide handling are relatively short operations from a contact-time perspective,
they are two of the highest-dose operations and demand the most attention from
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radiological engineering. Conversely, the “material out” operation is relatively lengthy
but results in one of the lowest doses.
A potential area for further study is the blending operation. Before the
radiological protection organization can adequately analyze blending operations, the
operation will require further specification. Blending is likely to be of significant
radiological concern because it will require significant time with hands near the source
material and therefore it warrants further study.
Figure 31. Whole Body Dose per operation for a single batch (left) Worker Time (in
hours) per operation for a single batch (right).
Primary Pu Processing
Secondary Pu Processing
Am Oxalate Precipitation
Am Oxalate Calcination
Am Oxide Handling
Material Out
GB 3 Secondary Background

3.4.2 Extremity Dose
Extremity dose is of most concern in these operations. For the “material out”
operation, MCNP calculations were performed at the surface of and six inches from the
inner container. The other cases were assumed to have dose rates equal to those
associated with the filter boat shielded by 0.125 inches of lead and 30-mil leaded gloves.
Dose rates were calculated at the surface of the filter boat and at a distance of 10 cm at a
height equal to the center of the source inside the boat.
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Table 29 presents the extremity doses per batch and per year (assuming 25
batches per year) for each set of operations in the americium recovery operations. Under
the current assumptions, it is estimated that the total extremity dose associated with one
batch would be 558.1 person-mrem leading to a yearly dose of 13,952.5 person-mrem
under the assumption of 25 batches per year. As discussed before, the 30-mil thick
leaded gloves were assumed for operations Gloveboxes 1and 4. Operations in Glovebox
2 were modeled using 65-mil gloves. The use of 65-mil gloves is being discussed in the
other gloveboxes. However, more detailed information is required to assess whether or
not the use of 65-mil gloves will significantly affect process times; the dexterity of the
operators will be compromised by the use of lead-lined gloves that are over twice as
thick. Longer process times and decreased dexterity will increase exposure time and thus
dose. Whether or not this increase in exposure time will lead to doses comparable with
30-mil gloves remains to be seen. A follow-on activity would be to work with the SMEs
to estimate process time changes with the thicker gloves and perform a new dose analysis
with the new time-motion data to support comparative analysis.
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Table 29. Doses to the extremities per batch and per year for each operation broken down
by glovebox. Yearly values assume 25 batches per year. Times presented in “Sum with
Background” row represent the time spent out of gloves.
Glovebox

Glovebox
1

Glovebox
2

Glovebox
4

Glovebox
3
All
Processes

Operation
Primary Pu
Processing
Glovebox 1
Total
Secondary Pu
Processing
Am Oxalate
Precipitation
Glovebox 2
Total
Am Oxalate
Calcination
Am Oxide
Handling
Material Out
Glovebox 4
Total
Sum of all
Gloveboxes
Secondary
Background
Total
Secondary
Background
Sum with
background

Time per batch
(h)

Yearly dose
(mrem)

Yearly time (h)

Dose per batch
(mrem)

103

101.5

2536

103

101.5

2536

40

8.10

203

48

158.99

3974

88

167.09

4177

10.5

25.67

641

18.25

94.52

2363

15

94.13

2353

1.75

43.75

214.3

5358

9.42

234.75

482.8

12,070

8

200

8

200

75.5 24,25

1888

75.5

1888

92.9

2,323

558.1

13,958

4.15
4.15
1.6
1.92
3.52
0.42
0.73
0.6

The photon and neutron contributions to extremity dose from these operations are shown
in Table 30.

24

This is derived from 67.5 hours out of gloves (from the time motion study) for gloveboxes 1, 2 and 4
added to 8 hours out of gloves for glovebox 3.
25
System Functions and Requirements Analysis for Am-241 Recovery Operations, Los Alamos National
Laboratory (2010) LA-CP-10-1109
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Table 30. Photon and neutron contributions from each unit operation modeled in the
americium recovery project. Omits secondary background
Glovebox

Glovebox
1

Glovebox
2

Glovebox
4

Operation

Photon Contribution
Yearly dose
Dose per
(mrem)
batch (mrem)

Neutron Contribution
Yearly dose
Dose per batch
(mrem)
(mrem)

Primary Pu
Processing

95.82

2,396

5.64

141

Glovebox 1 Total

95.82

2,396

5.64

141

Secondary Pu
Processing
Am Oxalate
Precipitation

6.21

155.3

1.89

47.34

153.1

3,827

5.89

147.2

Glovebox 2 Total

159.3

3,982

7.8

195

Am Oxalate
Calcination
Am Oxide
Handling

23.87

596.7

1.80

45.01

69.61

1740

24.91

622.87

Material Out

65.09

1627

29.04

725.91

Glovebox 4 Total

158.6

3,963

55.75

1,394

Sum of all
Gloveboxes

413.67

10,340

69.2

1,730

Dose from Transport of Samples to Analytical Chemistry
Samples (~35 mg of AmO2) will be taken from each batch and transported to the
Los Alamos analytical chemistry group for characterization. This operation is not
included in the dose analysis because the dose rate at 30 cm from the source with no
shielding is found to be 72.5 mrem/h, which is below the 100 mrem/h at 1 foot (30.48
cm) threshold above which a radiation work plan is necessary per the Los Alamos
National Laboratory safety-basis organization.
3.4.3 Estimating the Minimum Number of Workers to Maintain Risks at Acceptable
Levels
As discussed above, the 25 operations per year cannot be performed by a single
individual based on both dose and time constraints; a single worker would require over
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84 weeks to complete 25 operations based on a 40-hour work week and would exceed
their federal limit for both whole body and extremity dose.
The ratio of extremity dose to whole body dose is roughly 5:1. The administrative
control level for extremity dose at Los Alamos is 20 rem per year; thus, the ratio of the
whole-body dose limit to the extremity dose limit is 10:1 which is sufficiently large to
allow a broad range of work. Table 31 compares the dose incurred by each employee
under the assumption that with each additional employee the work (and dose) is spread
evenly among them.
Table 31. Dose incurred by employees with varying workforce sizes.

# employees

Yearly Hours
Worked

Whole Body
(rem/year)

Extremity
(rem/year)

1

2,346

3.325

13.958

2

1,173.5

1.663

6.979

3

782

1.108

4.653

4

586.5

0.831

3.490

5

469.2

0.665

2.792

6

391

0.554

2.326

7

335

0.475

1.994

By the federal mandate of ALARA [111], the dose-response model required when
designing or optimizing radiation protection schemes is the linear, no-threshold model.
Thus, the LNT model calculated in the previous chapter for all-cancer risks will form the
foundation of this study. However, it is interesting to examine the use of non-linear doseresponse data. Thus for comparison, risk values calculated based on the binned results are
also considered.
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Comparing Programmatic Cost and Benefit
This section will compare the ALARA reasonable expenditures with the marginal
cost per employee. The ALARA-reasonable expenditure is defined as the difference in
the amount of programmatic dollars that is “reasonable” to spend to further divide the
dose by additional workers. Because lower doses per individual result in lower ALARAreasonable expenditures, the amount saved (defined to be a negative change) increases in
magnitude. Thus, the benefit is considered to be the difference between the ALARAreasonable amount for n employees and the ALARA-reasonable amount for 1 employee.
This analysis is performed for watch levels of 1 rem, 800 mrem and 500 mrem.
Cost Benefit at a 1-rem Watch Level.
When comparing the programmatic benefit (the reduction in ALARA-reasonable cost for
n employees when compared with 1 employee), at a watch level of 1 rem, Figure 32
demonstrates that approximately 3.3 employees are required to make the change in cost
equal to the benefit. The discontinuity seen in the ALARA-savings line represents the
point at which the dose to each individual worker decreases below the watch level, and
thus the ALARA-reasonable value decreases to the lower level.
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Figure 32. Marginal cost and benefit curves for 1-rem watch level. The benefit is defined
as the difference in the ALARA-reasonable expenditure between 1 and n employees. The
marginal cost is the change in the amount spent to compensate each employee.

Cost Benefit at an 800-mrem watch level.
At a dose-watch level of 800 mrem, the ALARA-reasonable expenditures
increase, and close to 4.15workers are justified. This is shown in Figure 33.
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Figure 33. Marginal cost and benefit curves for 800-mrem watch level. The benefit is
defined as the difference in the ALARA-reasonable expenditure between 1 and n
employees. The marginal cost is the change in the amount spent to compensate each
employee.
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Cost Benefit at a 500-mrem watch level.
At a dose-watch level of 500 mrem, the ALARA-reasonable expenditures
increase more dramatically, and approximately to 4.9 workers are justified as shown in
Figure 36.
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Figure 34. Marginal cost and benefit curves for 500-mrem watch level. The benefit is
defined as the difference in the ALARA-reasonable expenditure between 1 and n.
This method of estimating the number of employees is possibly the least
controversial because it does not depend on an estimate for the value of statistical life and
thus avoids the question of whether employees are being appropriately compensated for
the risk they incur. However, setting a value for ALARA-reasonable is difficult, as
discussed in Chapter 1, and monetary estimates of risk will necessarily come into play in
their derivations.
Marginal Risk-Benefit Analysis Considering LNT and Bin-averaged Estimates of Risk
Figure 35 compares the marginal risks for each dose-response model (linear and
bin-averaged) with the marginal benefit to each worker of adding additional employees.
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Figure 35. Comparison of marginal risk values for both LNT and bin-avereaged estimates
of risk with marginal benefit values. Staffing levels are incremented by 0.1 employees.
The marginal benefit represents the change in the amount that the worker will
perform as additional workers are added to the project, and thus the change in the
effective compensation he will receive for accepting less risk. Based on the estimate of
marginal risk value, the point beyond which the marginal risk value increases beyond the
marginal benefit is the point at which the employee is being appropriately compensated
for the change in risk he is accepting when considering the value of statistical life. At the
higher doses (lower number of employees), the change in risk with each individual added
to the project decreases the risk value more than it decreases the compensation. Above
approximately 6.4 workers, (considering the bin-averaged model) the risk value decreases
faster than the compensation; thus the worker is accepting less compensation but not
receiving commensurate benefit (in risk reduction). Above around 6.6, for the binned
estimates, the hormetic effect comes into play and the worker again begins experiencing
some benefit with respect to risk value.
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The curve representing the linear, no-threshold estimate of marginal risk value
implies that, for all staffing plans, the risk value decreases more slowly than does the
worker’s compensation for taking on less risk. Thus, when considering this model, there
is no reasonable basis for dose spreading beyond local, administrative controls.
Marginal Risk-ALARA Analysis
Because the Department of Energy mandates that doses be kept ALARA, the Los
Alamos definition of ALARA-reasonable, ($2,000 per person rem avoided and $10,000
per person rem avoided ) will be used to calculate the change in the value of ALARAreasonable expenditures as the staffing levels are increased (and doses to individuals are
decreased. This will be compared with the LNT estimate of marginal risk value to
estimate at what level the change in risk to the individual equals the change in the Los
Alamos definition of reasonable radiation safety expenditures.
The current watch level (at which ALARA-reasonable spending jumps to the $10,000 per
person-rem avoided) is 1 rem. This analysis will consider the marginal ALARA value for
this watch level as well as for watch levels set at 0.8 rem/year and 0.5 rem/year. Plots for
the comparisons of LNT marginal risk value and marginal ALARA risk value for watch
levels set at 1 rem, 0.8 rem, and 0.5 rem are shown in Figure 36, Figure 37, and Figure 38
respectively.

126

Figure 36. Comparison of Marginal Risk Value (LNT) with marginal ALARA value at a
watch level of 1 rem/year. Staff levels are incremented by 0.1 workers. The discontinuity
is due to the piece-wise definition of the ALARA value; the break occurs where the first
derivative does not exist.

Figure 37. Comparison of Marginal Risk Value (LNT) with marginal ALARA value at a
watch level of 0.8 rem/year. Staff levels are incremented by 0.1 workers. The
discontinuity is due to the piece-wise definition of the ALARA value; the break occurs
where the first derivative does not exist.
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Figure 38. Comparison of Marginal Risk Value (LNT) with marginal ALARA value at a
watch level of 0.5 rem/year. Staff levels are incremented by 0.1 workers. The
discontinuity is due to the piece-wise definition of the ALARA value; the break occurs
where the first derivative does not exist.

For watch levels set at 1 and 0.8 rem/year, the change in risk value never reaches
the change in ALARA value. This implies that, for these watch levels, the change in
spending to reduce the dose to each individual exceeds the reasonable (from the
$2,000/$10,000 definition) amount that should be spent to achieve the dose reduction
affected by each additional employee.
For a watch level of 0.5 rem, the marginal risk value reaches the marginal
ALARA value around 5.7 workers (who would each receive around 0.6 rem). This
implies that 5.5 workers is, for a watch level of 0.5 rem, the point of diminishing returns;
this is to say that beyond a staffing level of about 5.8 workers, the decrease in risk value
to each worker will be less than the decrease in spending per worker. Thus it is not cost
effective to add additional workers.
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When this result is taken along with the risk-benefit analysis illustrated in Figure
35 above, it is seen that selecting a staffing level for this project based on a comparative
analysis of the change in cost incurred for a change in risk value (around 6.4 workers)
satisfies the ALARA criterion at this watch levels as well as the two less restrictive
levels.
3.5 Chapter Conclusions
The work described in this chapter developed a full radiological protection
assessment for the developing Americium Recovery Project, including development of
exposure cases, creation and modification of MCNP5 models, development of a timeand-motion study and the final synthesis of all data. This work also developed a new
method of determining whether administrative controls, such as staffing increases, are
ALARA-optimized. This was achieved by the application of risk estimates developed in
this work to the doses developed by the dose-assessment to determine the activityspecific risk. The EPA’s estimate of the value of statistical life was applied to these risk
estimates to determine the risk value. The rate of change of this risk value (marginal risk)
was then compared with the rate of change of workers’ cost as additional workers were
added to the project to reduce the dose (and risk) to each individual.
The dose-modeling effort in this project developed, through interaction with
stakeholders and decision makers, a simplified model of the doses expected to be
incurred by workers on the ARP at Los Alamos National Laboratory. This was done in
two phases: MCNP modeling of relevant exposure cases developed in accordance with
the subject-matter expert and the radiation protection division, and estimation of workers
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time and motion during each unit operation in the project by interview with the ARP
project manager.
The MCNP modeling included both modification of existing glovebox models,
and development of new models, especially for extremity dose. The exposure cases were
developed over a series of months in weekly meetings with the developer of the ARP and
the team leader for radiological engineering at Los Alamos.
3.5.1 Summary of Results
It was found that for 25 operations a year, when also considering the facility
background dose, though the whole-body dose to a single employee would not exceed the
federal limit of 5 rem/year or the Los Alamos administrative control on extremity dose of
20 rem/year, it would exceed the administrative control limit on whole-body dose as well
as the design objectives for both whole-body and extremity dose. Both the radiological
and time constraints imposed by the planning basis make multiple workers on the project
a necessity.
To estimate the optimal number of workers, risk estimates developed in the
previous section were used and applied to the MCNP-calculated doses. These risks were
then monetized using the EPA’s estimate for the value of statistical life resulting in a
quantity called the “risk value.” As the dose was spread over a number of workers, the
rate of change of the risk value, called the marginal risk value, was compared with the
rate of change of the compensation the worker received, called the marginal benefit. The
estimate based on this method using a risk value derived from the bin-averaged relative
risks estimated that approximately 6.3 workers would be optimum from the perspective
of programmatic compensation. Comparing the marginal risk values derived from this
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work’s LNT estimate of risk to the marginal ALARA value shows that for watch levels
of 1 rem/year and 0.8 rem per year, the change in ALARA expenditures per person is
always less than the resulting change in risk value per person. This implies that
compensating the worker commensurate with their change in risk is within the
institutional definition of ALARA-reasonable.
For a watch level of 0.5 rem, however, the change in ALARA expenditures
reaches a point of diminishing returns at around 5.5 workers. Thus, for this watch level, it
is not cost effective to compensate more than this many workers at the level of their risk
value.
The radiological protection organization at Los Alamos is currently investigating
methods by which they can quantitatively account for ALARA practices into their
analyses. This work presents a method for justifying practices based on the assumed
definition of “reasonable.” Practices resulting in costs that exceed the “reasonable”
threshold, such as dose spreading, though deemed “unreasonable” from an optimization
point of view, would be deemed “ultra-reasonable” from an ALARA standpoint.
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Chapter 4. Final Summary and Conclusion
4.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the accomplishments and results presented in this research
as well as a section suggesting several areas for future work expanding upon that
presented here. The work presented in this dissertation spanned several disciplines,
including applied and theoretical radiation epidemiology, external dosimetry, and risk
assessment. Each section had its own accomplishments and results where an
accomplishment describes the development of method or model, and a result is the
outcome of the application of the method or model.
4.2 Accomplishments
4.2.1 Epidemiological Accomplishments
This research began by developing a new framework, including a new statistical
method, for evaluating the occupational risks seen by workers, not only in radiation
environments, but in any setting where ALARA practices are mandated. This was
achieved by developing a hypothesis-test-based procedure for evaluating the
homogeneity of various epidemiological cohorts, and thus the appropriateness of
aggregate data pooling.
When data sets do not conform to an analyst’s given criterion for homogeneity,
aggregate pooling cannot be applied. Thus, this research developed a new statistical
methodology as an alternative to aggregate pooling for situations in which individual
cohorts show heterogeneity between them and are thus unsuitable for aggregate analysis.
This method was based on fixed- and random-effects models used in statistical metaanalysis for the combination of previously published results.
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4.2.2 Accomplishments related to the Americium Recovery Project Analysis
The work described in Chapter 3 developed a full radiological protection
assessment for the developing Americium Recovery Project (ARP), including
development of exposure cases, creation and modification of MCNP5 models,
development of a time-and-motion study, and the final synthesis of all data. This work
also developed a new method of determining whether administrative controls, such as
staffing increases, are ALARA-optimized. This was achieved by the application of risk
estimates developed in this work to the doses developed by the dose-assessment to
determine the activity-specific risk. The EPA’s estimate of the value of statistical life was
applied to these risk estimates to determine the risk value. The rate of change of this risk
value (marginal risk) was then compared with the rate of change of burdened,
programmatic cost as additional workers were added to the project to reduce the dose
(and risk) to each individual.
4.3 Results
4.31 Epidemiological Results
The statistical methods that were developed for the analysis of epidemiological
data were applied to estimate the all-cancer mortality risks incurred by workers at four
Department of Energy nuclear weapons laboratories: Los Alamos National Laboratory,
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Rocky Flats Plant, and the Hanford Site.
The homogeneity hypothesis-testing procedure developed in this work was
applied to these data sets to assess their candidacy for aggregate pooling. It was shown
that the unexposed populations from each study were not homogeneous with respect to
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each other and thus were not suitable for aggregate pooling. A subset of these studies had
been pooled in the past and these studies should be revisited.
Both linear, no-threshold and dose-bin averaged risks were calculated using fixedand random-effects models (respectively) necessary for combining demonstrably
heterogeneous data sets. The linear, no-threshold estimate calculated in this work showed
excellent agreement with currently accepted estimates of relative risk per unit dose. The
dose-bin averaged risks showed that, for lifetime doses below about 1 rem, exposure to
radiation can provide a prophylactic effect with respect to all-cancer mortality. It was
further shown that pooled analysis tends to overestimate the risks with respect to those
calculated by the methods developed in this work. A reprint of the bin-averaged risks is
shown in Figure 39.
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Figure 39. Reprint of dose-bin averaged risks combined using a random-effects model.
4.3.2 Results of the Americium Project Risk Analysis
Dose rates were calculated for each of the selected exposure cases associated with
unit operations in the americium recovery project. The primary doses from these
processes were found to satisfy the local administrative control limits of 2 rem per year to
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the whole body. When considering secondary background doses, the analysis showed that
the DOE requirement of 5 rem per year whole body and 50 rem per year to the
extremities. A table presenting the calculated whole-body doses for each unit operation is
shown in Table 32.
The risk estimates developed in Chapter 2 were used in Chapter 3 to assess the
risks to workers engaged in americium recovery operations at Los Alamos. Using the
risk-value method of ALARA assessment staffing plans were devised that both satisfied
the LANL’s administrative control limits and ensured that doses were kept ALARA for
several definitions of reasonable.
Table 32. Reprint of photon and neutron contribution to whole-body dose from
americium recovery unit operations.
Photon Contribution
Glovebox

Glovebox
1

Glovebox
2

Glovebox
4

Neutron Contribution
Yearly
Dose per
dose
batch
(mrem)
(mrem)

Operation

Dose per
batch
(mrem)

Yearly dose
(mrem)

Primary Pu
Processing
Glovebox 1
Total
Secondary Pu
Processing
Am Oxalate
Precipitation
Glovebox 2
Total
Am Oxalate
Calcination
Am Oxide
Handling

15.1

376.6

2.6

64.2

15.1

376.6

2.6

64.2

0.9

21.8

1.1

26.6

7.0

174.2

2.8

69.9

7.8

196

3.86

96.4

0.3

7.7

1.3

31.7

0.6

15.3

2.9

71.8

Material Out

3.7

91.6

1.1

28.1

Glovebox 4
Total
Sum of all
Gloveboxes

4.6

115

5.26
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27.49

687.19

11.69

292.26
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4.4 Future Work
Several areas present themselves for further study. The studies examined in the
epidemiological analysis reported doses recorded using differing types of detector (film
badges and thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs). The fraction of workers who had
doses recorded exclusively in film badges, TLDs and both are shown in Table 33.
Table 33. Fraction of workers from each study with doses recorded by film badge,
thermoluminescent dosimeter or both. Estimated based on years of usage for each
dosimeter type [126].
Dosimeter Fraction
TLD

Film Badge

Both

LANL

0

1

0

Hanford

0.29

0.46

0.25

Rocky

0.32

0.29

0.39

ORNL

0.01

0.91

0.08

The analysis performed in this work would be repeated using datasets that are
homogeneous with respect to detector type. Further, the CEDR database contains many
additional occupational radiation studies that could be incorporated into the analysis.
These additional studies could also be stratified by dosimeter thus allowing the possibility
for improved statistical significance despite the reduced cohort sizes. Further the
epidemiological methods developed in this work could also be applied to any situation
with quantifiably heterogeneous cohorts, not just those exposed to ionizing radiation. One
potential radiological case of interest is the analysis of the risks in cohorts exposed to
naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM). Geographically disparate cohorts could
be combined to make more statistically significant conclusions.
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The ALARA staffing methodology developed in this work will be expanded to
develop a risk-based estimate for the monetary value of “reasonable” as the
$2,000/$10,000 definition is obsolescing. This risk-based approach would provide a
firmer, more justifiable basis for estimating what constitutes a reasonable standard of
safety. New, composite glove materials have been developed and analyzed for this
project [127], and their effectiveness in some of the specific exposure cases should be
evaluated. Additionally, the dose analysis of the americium recovery project will be
compared with actual dosimetry data when the program becomes operational and the
differences will be documented.
4.5 Conclusion
This work has developed, from basic epidemiological data, a framework for
assessing ALARA practices at specific institutions. By developing institutionally-specific
risks in the manner performed in this work (accounting for homogeneity between cohorts
and using the new methodology here developed) and applying them to a risk-benefit
analysis, it is possible to quantitatively determine whether a given practice is, truly
ALARA. Further, the risk-benefit analysis methodology will provide a more rational
basis for estimates of ALARA-reasonable values.
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